Guide to the Secure Configuration of CentOS Linux 7

with profile CNSSI 1253 Low/Low/Low Control Baseline for CentOS Linux 7
This profile follows the Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) No. 1253, "Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems" on security controls to meet low confidentiality, low integrity, and low assurance."

This guide presents a catalog of security-relevant configuration settings for CentOS Linux 7 formatted in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF).

Providing system administrators with such guidance informs them how to securely configure systems under their control in a variety of network roles. Policy makers and baseline creators can use this catalog of settings, with its associated references to higher-level security control catalogs, in order to assist them in security baseline creation. This guide is a catalog, not a checklist, and satisfaction of every item is not likely to be possible or sensible in many operational scenarios. However, the XCCDF format enables granular selection and adjustment of settings, and their association with OVAL and OCIL content provides an automated checking capability. Transformations of this document, and its associated automated checking content, are capable of providing baselines that meet a diverse set of policy objectives. Some example XCCDF Profiles, which are selections of items that form checklists and can be used as baselines, are available with this guide. They can be processed, in an automated fashion, with tools that support the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP). The DISA STIG for CentOS Linux 7 is one example of a baseline created from this guidance.

This benchmark is a direct port of a SCAP Security Guide benchmark developed for Red Hat Enterprise Linux. It has been modified through an automated process to remove specific dependencies on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and to function with CentOS. The result is a generally useful SCAP Security Guide benchmark with the following caveats:

  • CentOS is not an exact copy of Red Hat Enterprise Linux. There may be configuration differences that produce false positives and/or false negatives. If this occurs please file a bug report.
  • CentOS has its own build system, compiler options, patchsets, and is a community supported, non-commercial operating system. CentOS does not inherit certifications or evaluations from Red Hat Enterprise Linux. As such, some configuration rules (such as those requiring FIPS 140-2 encryption) will continue to fail on CentOS.

Members of the CentOS community are invited to participate in OpenSCAP and SCAP Security Guide development. Bug reports and patches can be sent to GitHub: https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide. The mailing list is at https://fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide.

Do not attempt to implement any of the settings in this guide without first testing them in a non-operational environment. The creators of this guidance assume no responsibility whatsoever for its use by other parties, and makes no guarantees, expressed or implied, about its quality, reliability, or any other characteristic.
Profile TitleCNSSI 1253 Low/Low/Low Control Baseline for CentOS Linux 7
Profile IDxccdf_org.ssgproject.content_profile_nist-cl-il-al

Revision History

Current version: 0.1.30

  • draft (as of 2017-03-03)

Platforms

  • cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:7
  • cpe:/o:centos:centos:7
  • cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:7::client
  • cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:7::computenode

Table of Contents

  1. System Settings
    1. Installing and Maintaining Software
    2. File Permissions and Masks
    3. SELinux
    4. Account and Access Control
    5. Network Configuration and Firewalls
    6. Configure Syslog
    7. System Accounting with auditd
  2. Services
    1. Obsolete Services
    2. Base Services
    3. Cron and At Daemons
    4. SSH Server
    5. Avahi Server
    6. Print Support
    7. DHCP
    8. Network Time Protocol
    9. Mail Server Software
    10. LDAP
    11. DNS Server
    12. FTP Server
    13. Web Server

Checklist

contains 206 rules

System Settingsgroup

Contains rules that check correct system settings.

contains 146 rules

Installing and Maintaining Softwaregroup

The following sections contain information on security-relevant choices during the initial operating system installation process and the setup of software updates.

contains 14 rules

Disk Partitioninggroup

To ensure separation and protection of data, there are top-level system directories which should be placed on their own physical partition or logical volume. The installer's default partitioning scheme creates separate logical volumes for /, /boot, and swap.

  • If starting with any of the default layouts, check the box to "Review and modify partitioning." This allows for the easy creation of additional logical volumes inside the volume group already created, though it may require making /'s logical volume smaller to create space. In general, using logical volumes is preferable to using partitions because they can be more easily adjusted later.
  • If creating a custom layout, create the partitions mentioned in the previous paragraph (which the installer will require anyway), as well as separate ones described in the following sections.
If a system has already been installed, and the default partitioning scheme was used, it is possible but nontrivial to modify it to create separate logical volumes for the directories listed above. The Logical Volume Manager (LVM) makes this possible. See the LVM HOWTO at http://tldp.org/HOWTO/LVM-HOWTO/ for more detailed information on LVM.

contains 2 rules

Ensure /var/log Located On Separate Partitionrule

System logs are stored in the /var/log directory. Ensure that it has its own partition or logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM.

Rationale:

Placing /var/log in its own partition enables better separation between log files and other files in /var/.

Ensure /var/log/audit Located On Separate Partitionrule

Audit logs are stored in the /var/log/audit directory. Ensure that it has its own partition or logical volume at installation time, or migrate it later using LVM. Make absolutely certain that it is large enough to store all audit logs that will be created by the auditing daemon.

Rationale:

Placing /var/log/audit in its own partition enables better separation between audit files and other files, and helps ensure that auditing cannot be halted due to the partition running out of space.

Software Integrity Checkinggroup

Both the AIDE (Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment) software and the RPM package management system provide mechanisms for verifying the integrity of installed software. AIDE uses snapshots of file metadata (such as hashes) and compares these to current system files in order to detect changes. The RPM package management system can conduct integrity checks by comparing information in its metadata database with files installed on the system.

Integrity checking cannot prevent intrusions, but can detect that they have occurred. Requirements for software integrity checking may be highly dependent on the environment in which the system will be used. Snapshot-based approaches such as AIDE may induce considerable overhead in the presence of frequent software updates.

contains 6 rules

Verify Integrity with AIDEgroup

AIDE conducts integrity checks by comparing information about files with previously-gathered information. Ideally, the AIDE database is created immediately after initial system configuration, and then again after any software update. AIDE is highly configurable, with further configuration information located in /usr/share/doc/aide-VERSION.

contains 3 rules

Install AIDErule

Install the AIDE package with the command:

$ sudo yum install aide

Rationale:

The AIDE package must be installed if it is to be available for integrity checking.

Remediation script:

function package_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
  install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
  install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi

if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
  # If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
  if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
else
  # If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
  if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
fi

}

package_command install aide

Build and Test AIDE Databaserule

Run the following command to generate a new database:

$ sudo /usr/sbin/aide --init
By default, the database will be written to the file /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz. Storing the database, the configuration file /etc/aide.conf, and the binary /usr/sbin/aide (or hashes of these files), in a secure location (such as on read-only media) provides additional assurance about their integrity. The newly-generated database can be installed as follows:
$ sudo cp /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz
To initiate a manual check, run the following command:
$ sudo /usr/sbin/aide --check
If this check produces any unexpected output, investigate.

Rationale:

For AIDE to be effective, an initial database of "known-good" information about files must be captured and it should be able to be verified against the installed files.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-3(d), CM-3(e), CM-6(d), CM-6(3), SC-28, SI-7, Req-11.5

Remediation script:
/usr/sbin/aide --init

Configure Periodic Execution of AIDErule

To implement a daily execution of AIDE at 4:05am using cron, add the following line to /etc/crontab:

05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check
AIDE can be executed periodically through other means; this is merely one example.

Rationale:

By default, AIDE does not install itself for periodic execution. Periodically running AIDE is necessary to reveal unexpected changes in installed files.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-3(d), CM-3(e), CM-6(d), CM-6(3), SC-28, SI-7, 374, 416, 1069, 1263, 1297, 1589, Req-11.5, 1.3.1

Remediation script:
echo "05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check" >> /etc/crontab

Verify Integrity with RPMgroup

The RPM package management system includes the ability to verify the integrity of installed packages by comparing the installed files with information about the files taken from the package metadata stored in the RPM database. Although an attacker could corrupt the RPM database (analogous to attacking the AIDE database as described above), this check can still reveal modification of important files. To list which files on the system differ from what is expected by the RPM database:

$ rpm -qVa
See the man page for rpm to see a complete explanation of each column.

contains 2 rules

Verify and Correct File Permissions with RPMrule

Discretionary access control is weakened if a user or group has access permissions to system files and directories greater than the default. The RPM package management system can check file access permissions of installed software packages, including many that are important to system security. Verify that the file permissions, ownership, and gruop membership of system files and commands match vendor values. Check the file permissions, ownership, and group membership with the following command:

$ sudo rpm -Va | grep '^.M'
Output indicates files that do not match vendor defaults. After locating a file with incorrect permissions, run the following command to determine which package owns it:
$ rpm -qf FILENAME
Next, run the following command to reset its permissions to the correct values:
$ sudo rpm --setperms PACKAGENAME

warning  Note: Due to a bug in the gdm package, the RPM verify command may continue to fail even after file permissions have been correctly set on /var/log/gdm. This is being tracked in Red Hat Bugzilla #1275532.
Rationale:

Permissions on system binaries and configuration files that are too generous could allow an unauthorized user to gain privileges that they should not have. The permissions set by the vendor should be maintained. Any deviations from this baseline should be investigated.

Remediation script:

# Declare array to hold list of RPM packages we need to correct permissions for
declare -a SETPERMS_RPM_LIST

# Create a list of files on the system having permissions different from what
# is expected by the RPM database
FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS=($(rpm -Va --nofiledigest | grep '^.M'))

# For each file path from that list:
# * Determine the RPM package the file path is shipped by,
# * Include it into SETPERMS_RPM_LIST array

for FILE_PATH in "${FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS[@]}"
do
	RPM_PACKAGE=$(rpm -qf "$FILE_PATH")
	SETPERMS_RPM_LIST=("${SETPERMS_RPM_LIST[@]}" "$RPM_PACKAGE")
done

# Remove duplicate mention of same RPM in $SETPERMS_RPM_LIST (if any)
SETPERMS_RPM_LIST=( $(echo "${SETPERMS_RPM_LIST[@]}" | sort -n | uniq) )

# For each of the RPM packages left in the list -- reset its permissions to the
# correct values
for RPM_PACKAGE in "${SETPERMS_RPM_LIST[@]}"
do
	rpm --setperms "${RPM_PACKAGE}"
done

Verify File Hashes with RPMrule

Without cryptographic integrity protections, system executables and files can be altered by unauthorized users without detection. The RPM package management system can check the hashes of installed software packages, including many that are important to system security. To verify that the cryptographic hash of system files and commands match vendor values, run the following command to list which files on the system have hashes that differ from what is expected by the RPM database:

$ rpm -Va | grep '^..5'
A "c" in the second column indicates that a file is a configuration file, which may appropriately be expected to change. If the file was not expected to change, investigate the cause of the change using audit logs or other means. The package can then be reinstalled to restore the file. Run the following command to determine which package owns the file:
$ rpm -qf FILENAME
The package can be reinstalled from a yum repository using the command:
$ sudo yum reinstall PACKAGENAME
Alternatively, the package can be reinstalled from trusted media using the command:
$ sudo rpm -Uvh PACKAGENAME

Rationale:

The hashes of important files like system executables should match the information given by the RPM database. Executables with erroneous hashes could be a sign of nefarious activity on the system.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-6(d), CM-6(3), SI-7, 1496, Req-11.5, 1.2.6, RHEL-07-010020

GNOME Desktop Environmentgroup

GNOME is a graphical desktop environment bundled with many Linux distributions that allow users to easily interact with the operating system graphically rather than textually. The GNOME Graphical Display Manager (GDM) provides login, logout, and user switching contexts as well as display server management.

GNOME is developed by the GNOME Project and is considered the default Red Hat Graphical environment.

For more information on GNOME and the GNOME Project, see https://www.gnome.org

contains 6 rules

Configure GNOME Screen Lockinggroup

In the default GNOME3 desktop, the screen can be locked by selecting the user name in the far right corner of the main panel and selecting Lock.

The following sections detail commands to enforce idle activation of the screensaver, screen locking, a blank-screen screensaver, and an idle activation time.

Because users should be trained to lock the screen when they step away from the computer, the automatic locking feature is only meant as a backup.

The root account can be screen-locked; however, the root account should never be used to log into an X Windows environment and should only be used to for direct login via console in emergency circumstances.

For more information about enforcing preferences in the GNOME3 environment using the DConf configuration system, see http://wiki.gnome.org/dconf and the man page dconf(1). For Red Hat specific information on configuring DConf settings, see https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/Desktop_Migration_and_Administration_Guide/part-Configuration_and_Administration.html

contains 4 rules

Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeoutrule

The idle time-out value for inactivity in the GNOME3 desktop is configured via the idle-delay setting must be set under an appropriate configuration file(s) in the /etc/dconf/db/local.d directory and locked in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks directory to prevent user modification.
For example, to configure the system for a 15 minute delay, add the following to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings:

[org/gnome/desktop/session]
idle-delay=900
Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example:
/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.

Rationale:

A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME3 can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate a session lock.

Remediation script:

inactivity_timeout_value="900"

# Define constants to be reused below
ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SESSION="org/gnome/desktop/session"
SSG_DCONF_IDLE_DELAY_FILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/10-scap-security-guide"
SESSION_LOCKS_FILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/session"
IDLE_DELAY_DEFINED="FALSE"

# First update '[org/gnome/desktop/session] idle-delay' settings in
# /etc/dconf/db/local.d/* if already defined
for FILE in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/*
do
	if grep -q -d skip "$ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SESSION" "$FILE"
	then
		if grep 'idle-delay' "$FILE"
		then
			sed -i "s/idle-delay=.*/idle-delay=uint32 ${inactivity_timeout_value}/g" "$FILE"
			IDLE_DELAY_DEFINED="TRUE"
		fi
	fi
done

# Then define '[org/gnome/desktop/session] idle-delay' setting
# if still not defined yet
if [ "$IDLE_DELAY_DEFINED" != "TRUE" ]
then
	echo "" >> $SSG_DCONF_IDLE_DELAY_FILE
	echo "[org/gnome/desktop/session]" >>  $SSG_DCONF_IDLE_DELAY_FILE
	echo "idle-delay=uint32 ${inactivity_timeout_value}" >> $SSG_DCONF_IDLE_DELAY_FILE
fi

# Verify if 'idle-delay' modification is locked. If not, lock it
if ! grep -q "^/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SESSION}/idle-delay$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/*
then
	# Check if "$SESSION_LOCK_FILE" exists. If not, create it.
	if [ ! -f "$SESSION_LOCKS_FILE" ]
	then
		touch "$SESSION_LOCKS_FILE"
	fi
	echo "/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SESSION}/idle-delay" >> "$SESSION_LOCKS_FILE"
fi

Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activationrule

To activate the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop after a period of inactivity, add or set idle-activation-enabled to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example:

[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]
idle_activation_enabled=true
Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example:
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.

Rationale:

A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the session lock. Enabling idle activation of the screensaver ensures the screensaver will be activated after the idle delay. Applications requiring continuous, real-time screen display (such as network management products) require the login session does not have administrator rights and the display station is located in a controlled-access area.

Remediation script:

# Define constants to be reused below
ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER="org/gnome/desktop/screensaver"
SSG_DCONF_IDLE_ACTIVATION_FILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/10-scap-security-guide"
SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/screensaver"
IDLE_ACTIVATION_DEFINED="FALSE"

# First update '[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] idle-activation-enabled' settings in
# /etc/dconf/db/local.d/* if already defined
for FILE in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/*
do
	if grep -q -d skip "$ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER" "$FILE"
	then
		if grep 'idle-activation-enabled' "$FILE"
		then
			sed -i "s/idle-activation-enabled=.*/idle-activation-enabled=true/g" "$FILE"
			IDLE_ACTIVATION_DEFINED="TRUE"
		fi
	fi
done

# Then define '[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] idle-activation-enabled' setting
# if still not defined yet
if [ "$IDLE_ACTIVATION_DEFINED" != "TRUE" ]
then
	echo "" >> $SSG_DCONF_IDLE_ACTIVATION_FILE
	echo "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >>  $SSG_DCONF_IDLE_ACTIVATION_FILE
	echo "idle-activation-enabled=true" >> $SSG_DCONF_IDLE_ACTIVATION_FILE
fi

# Verify if 'idle-activation-enabled' modification is locked. If not, lock it
if ! grep -q "^/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER}/idle-activation-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/*
then
	# Check if "$SCREENSAVER_LOCK_FILE" exists. If not, create it.
	if [ ! -f "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE" ]
	then
		touch "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE"
	fi
	echo "/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER}/idle-activation-enabled" >> "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE"
fi

Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Periodrule

To activate locking of the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop when it is activated, add or set lock-enabled to true and lock-delay to 0 in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example:

[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]
lock-enabled=true
lock-delay=0
Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example:
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.

Rationale:

A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense.

Remediation script:

# Define constants to be reused below
ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER="org/gnome/desktop/screensaver"
SSG_DCONF_LOCK_ENABLED_FILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/10-scap-security-guide"
SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/screensaver"
LOCK_ENABLED_DEFINED="FALSE"
LOCK_DELAY_DEFINED="FALSE"

# First update '[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] lock-enabled' and
# '[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] lock-delay' settings in
# /etc/dconf/db/local.d/* if already defined
for FILE in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/*
do
	if grep -q -d skip "$ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER" "$FILE"
	then
		if grep 'lock-enabled' "$FILE"
		then
			sed -i "s/lock-enabled=.*/lock-enabled=true/g" "$FILE"
			LOCK_ENABLED_DEFINED="TRUE"
		fi
		if grep 'lock-delay' "$FILE"
		then
			sed -i "s/lock-delay=.*/lock-delay=uint32 0/g" "$FILE"
			LOCK_DELAY_DEFINED="TRUE"
		fi
	fi
done

# Then define '[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] lock-enabled' setting
# if still not defined yet
if [ "$LOCK_ENABLED_DEFINED" != "TRUE" ] || [ "$LOCK_DELAY_DEFINED" != "TRUE" ]
then
	echo "" >> $SSG_DCONF_LOCK_ENABLED_FILE
	echo "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >>  $SSG_DCONF_LOCK_ENABLED_FILE
	echo "lock-enabled=true" >> $SSG_DCONF_LOCK_ENABLED_FILE
	echo "lock-delay=uint32 0" >> $SSG_DCONF_LOCK_ENABLED_FILE
fi

# Verify if 'lock-enabled' modification is locked. If not, lock it
if ! grep -q "^/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER}/lock-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/*
then
	# Check if "$SCREENSAVER_LOCK_FILE" exists. If not, create it.
	if [ ! -f "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE" ]
	then
		touch "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE"
	fi
	echo "/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER}/lock-enabled" >> "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE"
fi


# Verify if 'lock-delay' modification is locked. If not, lock it
if ! grep -q "^/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER}/lock-delay$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/*
then
        # Check if "$SCREENSAVER_LOCK_FILE" exists. If not, create it.
        if [ ! -f "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE" ]
        then
                touch "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE"
        fi
        echo "/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER}/lock-delay" >> "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE"
fi

Implement Blank Screensaverrule

To set the screensaver mode in the GNOME3 desktop to a blank screen, add or set picture-uri to '' in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example:

[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]
picture-uri=''
Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example:
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.

Rationale:

Setting the screensaver mode to blank-only conceals the contents of the display from passersby.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-11(b), 60, Req-8.1.8

Remediation script:

# Define constants to be reused below
ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER="org/gnome/desktop/screensaver"
SSG_DCONF_MODE_BLANK_FILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/10-scap-security-guide"
SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/screensaver"
MODE_BLANK_DEFINED="FALSE"

# First update '[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] picture-uri' settings in
# /etc/dconf/db/local.d/* if already defined
for FILE in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/*
do
	if grep -q -d skip "$ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER" "$FILE"
	then
		if grep 'picture-uri' "$FILE"
		then
			sed -i "s/picture-uri=.*/picture-uri=string ''/g" "$FILE"
			MODE_BLANK_DEFINED="TRUE"
		fi
	fi
done

# Then define '[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] picture-uri' setting
# if still not defined yet
if [ "$MODE_BLANK_DEFINED" != "TRUE" ]
then
	echo "" >> $SSG_DCONF_MODE_BLANK_FILE
	echo "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >>  $SSG_DCONF_MODE_BLANK_FILE
	echo "picture-uri=string ''" >> $SSG_DCONF_MODE_BLANK_FILE
fi

# Verify if 'picture-uri' modification is locked. If not, lock it
if ! grep -q "^/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER}/picture-uri$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/*
then
	# Check if "$SCREENSAVER_LOCK_FILE" exists. If not, create it.
	if [ ! -f "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE" ]
	then
		touch "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE"
	fi
	echo "/${ORG_GNOME_DESKTOP_SCREENSAVER}/picture-uri" >> "$SCREENSAVER_LOCKS_FILE"
fi

GNOME Media Settingsgroup

GNOME media settings that apply to the graphical interface.

contains 2 rules

Disable GNOME3 Automountingrule

The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. To disable automount and autorun within GNOME3, add or set automount to false, automount-open to false, and autorun-never to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example:

[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]
automount=false
automount-open=false
autorun-never=true
Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example:
/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount
/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/auto-open
/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.

Rationale:

Disabling automatic mounting in GNOME3 can prevent the introduction of malware via removable media. It will, however, also prevent desktop users from legitimate use of removable media.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-19(a), AC-19(d), AC-19(e)

Disable All GNOME3 Thumbnailersrule

The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, uses a number of different thumbnailer programs to generate thumbnails for any new or modified content in an opened folder. To disable the execution of these thumbnail applications, add or set disable-all to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example:

[org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers]
disable-all=true
Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example:
/org/gnome/desktop/thumbnailers/disable-all
After the settings have been set, run dconf update. This effectively prevents an attacker from gaining access to a system through a flaw in GNOME3's Nautilus thumbnail creators.

Rationale:

An attacker with knowledge of a flaw in a GNOME3 thumbnailer application could craft a malicious file to exploit this flaw. Assuming the attacker could place the malicious file on the local filesystem (via a web upload for example) and assuming a user browses the same location using Nautilus, the malicious file would exploit the thumbnailer with the potential for malicious code execution. It is best to disable these thumbnailer applications unless they are explicitly required.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

File Permissions and Masksgroup

Traditional Unix security relies heavily on file and directory permissions to prevent unauthorized users from reading or modifying files to which they should not have access.

Several of the commands in this section search filesystems for files or directories with certain characteristics, and are intended to be run on every local partition on a given system. When the variable PART appears in one of the commands below, it means that the command is intended to be run repeatedly, with the name of each local partition substituted for PART in turn.

The following command prints a list of all xfs partitions on the local system, which is the default filesystem for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 installations:

$ mount -t xfs | awk '{print $3}'
For any systems that use a different local filesystem type, modify this command as appropriate.

contains 43 rules

Restrict Partition Mount Optionsgroup

System partitions can be mounted with certain options that limit what files on those partitions can do. These options are set in the /etc/fstab configuration file, and can be used to make certain types of malicious behavior more difficult.

contains 11 rules

Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitionsrule

The nodev mount option prevents files from being interpreted as character or block devices. Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any non-root local partitions.

Rationale:

The nodev mount option prevents files from being interpreted as character or block devices. The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails, for which it is not advised to set nodev on these filesystems.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1.1.11

Add nodev Option to Removable Media Partitionsrule

The nodev mount option prevents files from being interpreted as character or block devices. Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot jails built for system services. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any removable media partitions.

Rationale:

The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. An exception to this is chroot jails, and it is not advised to set nodev on partitions which contain their root filesystems.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-19(a), AC-19(d), AC-19(e), CM-7, MP-2

Add noexec Option to Removable Media Partitionsrule

The noexec mount option prevents the direct execution of binaries on the mounted filesystem. Preventing the direct execution of binaries from removable media (such as a USB key) provides a defense against malicious software that may be present on such untrusted media. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any removable media partitions.

Rationale:

Allowing users to execute binaries from removable media such as USB keys exposes the system to potential compromise.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-19(a), AC-19(d), AC-19(e), CM-7, MP-2, 87, 1.1.12

Add nosuid Option to Removable Media Partitionsrule

The nosuid mount option prevents set-user-identifier (SUID) and set-group-identifier (SGID) permissions from taking effect. These permissions allow users to execute binaries with the same permissions as the owner and group of the file respectively. Users should not be allowed to introduce SUID and SGID files into the system via partitions mounted from removeable media. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of any removable media partitions.

Rationale:

The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Allowing users to introduce SUID or SGID binaries from partitions mounted off of removable media would allow them to introduce their own highly-privileged programs.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-19(a), AC-19(d), AC-19(e), CM-7, MP-2, 1.1.13

Add nodev Option to /tmprule

The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from being created in /tmp. Legitimate character and block devices should not exist within temporary directories like /tmp. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /tmp.

Rationale:

The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, MP-2, 1.1.2

Add noexec Option to /tmprule

The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /tmp. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /tmp.

Rationale:

Allowing users to execute binaries from world-writable directories such as /tmp should never be necessary in normal operation and can expose the system to potential compromise.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, MP-2, 1.1.4

Add nosuid Option to /tmprule

The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /tmp. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in these world-writable directories. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /tmp.

Rationale:

The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from temporary storage partitions.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, MP-2, 1.1.3

Add nodev Option to /dev/shmrule

The nodev mount option can be used to prevent creation of device files in /dev/shm. Legitimate character and block devices should not exist within temporary directories like /dev/shm. Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /dev/shm.

Rationale:

The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, MP-2, 1.1.14

Add noexec Option to /dev/shmrule

The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being executed out of /dev/shm. It can be dangerous to allow the execution of binaries from world-writable temporary storage directories such as /dev/shm. Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /dev/shm.

Rationale:

Allowing users to execute binaries from world-writable directories such as /dev/shm can expose the system to potential compromise.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, MP-2, 1.1.16

Add nosuid Option to /dev/shmrule

The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution of setuid programs in /dev/shm. The SUID and SGID permissions should not be required in these world-writable directories. Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of /dev/shm.

Rationale:

The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from temporary storage partitions.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, MP-2, 1.1.14

Bind Mount /var/tmp To /tmprule

The /var/tmp directory is a world-writable directory. Bind-mount it to /tmp in order to consolidate temporary storage into one location protected by the same techniques as /tmp. To do so, edit /etc/fstab and add the following line:

/tmp     /var/tmp     none     rw,nodev,noexec,nosuid,bind     0 0
See the mount(8) man page for further explanation of bind mounting.

Rationale:

Having multiple locations for temporary storage is not required. Unless absolutely necessary to meet requirements, the storage location /var/tmp should be bind mounted to /tmp and thus share the same protections.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1.1.6

Restrict Dynamic Mounting and Unmounting of Filesystemsgroup

Linux includes a number of facilities for the automated addition and removal of filesystems on a running system. These facilities may be necessary in many environments, but this capability also carries some risk -- whether direct risk from allowing users to introduce arbitrary filesystems, or risk that software flaws in the automated mount facility itself could allow an attacker to compromise the system.

This command can be used to list the types of filesystems that are available to the currently executing kernel:

$ find /lib/modules/`uname -r`/kernel/fs -type f -name '*.ko'
If these filesystems are not required then they can be explicitly disabled in a configuratio file in /etc/modprobe.d.

contains 11 rules

Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driverrule

To prevent USB storage devices from being used, configure the kernel module loading system to prevent automatic loading of the USB storage driver. To configure the system to prevent the usb-storage kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install usb-storage /bin/true
This will prevent the modprobe program from loading the usb-storage module, but will not prevent an administrator (or another program) from using the insmod program to load the module manually.

Rationale:

USB storage devices such as thumb drives can be used to introduce malicious software.

Remediation script:
echo "install usb-storage /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf

Disable Kernel Support for USB via Bootloader Configurationrule

All USB support can be disabled by adding the nousb argument to the kernel's boot loader configuration. To do so, append "nousb" to the kernel line in /etc/default/grub as shown:

kernel /vmlinuz-VERSION ro vga=ext root=/dev/VolGroup00/LogVol00 rhgb quiet nousb
WARNING: Disabling all kernel support for USB will cause problems for systems with USB-based keyboards, mice, or printers. This configuration is infeasible for systems which require USB devices, which is common.

Rationale:

Disabling the USB subsystem within the Linux kernel at system boot will protect against potentially malicious USB devices, although it is only practical in specialized systems.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-19(a), AC-19(d), AC-19(e), 1250

Remediation script:

# Correct the form of default kernel command line in /etc/default/grub
if ! grep -q ^GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\".*nousb.*\" /etc/default/grub;
then
  # Edit configuration setting
  # Append 'nousb' argument to /etc/default/grub (if not present yet)
  sed -i "s/\(GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\)\"\(.*\)\"/\1\"\2 nousb\"/" /etc/default/grub
  # Edit runtime setting
  # Correct the form of kernel command line for each installed kernel in the bootloader
  /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="nousb"
fi

Disable Booting from USB Devices in Boot Firmwarerule

Configure the system boot firmware (historically called BIOS on PC systems) to disallow booting from USB drives.

Rationale:

Booting a system from a USB device would allow an attacker to circumvent any security measures provided by the operating system. Attackers could mount partitions and modify the configuration of the OS.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-19(a), AC-19(d), AC-19(e), 1250

Disable the Automounterrule

The autofs daemon mounts and unmounts filesystems, such as user home directories shared via NFS, on demand. In addition, autofs can be used to handle removable media, and the default configuration provides the cdrom device as /misc/cd. However, this method of providing access to removable media is not common, so autofs can almost always be disabled if NFS is not in use. Even if NFS is required, it may be possible to configure filesystem mounts statically by editing /etc/fstab rather than relying on the automounter.

The autofs service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable autofs.service

Rationale:

Disabling the automounter permits the administrator to statically control filesystem mounting through /etc/fstab.

Remediation script:
#
# Disable autofs.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable autofs.service

#
# Stop autofs.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop autofs.service

Disable Mounting of cramfsrule

To configure the system to prevent the cramfs kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install cramfs /bin/true
This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.

Rationale:

Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1.1.18

Remediation script:
echo "install cramfs /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf

Disable Mounting of freevxfsrule

To configure the system to prevent the freevxfs kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install freevxfs /bin/true
This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.

Rationale:

Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1.1.19

Remediation script:
echo "install freevxfs /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/freevxfs.conf

Disable Mounting of jffs2rule

To configure the system to prevent the jffs2 kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install jffs2 /bin/true
This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.

Rationale:

Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1.1.20

Remediation script:
echo "install jffs2 /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/jffs2.conf

Disable Mounting of hfsrule

To configure the system to prevent the hfs kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install hfs /bin/true
This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.

Rationale:

Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1.1.21

Remediation script:
echo "install hfs /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/hfs.conf

Disable Mounting of hfsplusrule

To configure the system to prevent the hfsplus kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install hfsplus /bin/true
This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.

Rationale:

Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1.1.22

Remediation script:
echo "install hfsplus /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/hfsplus.conf

Disable Mounting of squashfsrule

To configure the system to prevent the squashfs kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install squashfs /bin/true
This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.

Rationale:

Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1.1.23

Remediation script:
echo "install squashfs /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf

Disable Mounting of udfrule

To configure the system to prevent the udf kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install udf /bin/true
This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.

Rationale:

Linux kernel modules which implement filesystems that are not needed by the local system should be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1.1.24

Remediation script:
echo "install udf /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf

Verify Permissions on Important Files and Directoriesgroup

Permissions for many files on a system must be set restrictively to ensure sensitive information is properly protected. This section discusses important permission restrictions which can be verified to ensure that no harmful discrepancies have arisen.

contains 20 rules
contains 12 rules

Verify User Who Owns shadow Filerule

To properly set the owner of /etc/shadow, run the command:

$ sudo chown root /etc/shadow

Rationale:

The /etc/shadow file contains the list of local system accounts and stores password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. Failure to give ownership of this file to root provides the designated owner with access to sensitive information which could weaken the system security posture.

Remediation script:
chown root /etc/shadow

Verify Group Who Owns shadow Filerule

To properly set the group owner of /etc/shadow, run the command:

$ sudo chgrp root /etc/shadow

Rationale:

The /etc/shadow file stores password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security.

Remediation script:
chgrp root /etc/shadow

Verify Permissions on shadow Filerule

To properly set the permissions of /etc/shadow, run the command:

$ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/shadow

Rationale:

The /etc/shadow file contains the list of local system accounts and stores password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. Failure to give ownership of this file to root provides the designated owner with access to sensitive information which could weaken the system security posture.

Remediation script:
chmod 0000 /etc/shadow

Verify User Who Owns group Filerule

To properly set the owner of /etc/group, run the command:

$ sudo chown root /etc/group

Rationale:

The /etc/group file contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6, Req-8.7.c, Test attestation on 20121026 by DS

Remediation script:
chown root /etc/group

Verify Group Who Owns group Filerule

To properly set the group owner of /etc/group, run the command:

$ sudo chgrp root /etc/group

Rationale:

The /etc/group file contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security.

Remediation script:
chgrp root /etc/group

Verify Permissions on group Filerule

To properly set the permissions of /etc/group, run the command:

$ sudo chmod 644 /etc/group

Rationale:

The /etc/group file contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security.

Remediation script:
chmod 644 /etc/group

Verify User Who Owns gshadow Filerule

To properly set the owner of /etc/gshadow, run the command:

$ sudo chown root /etc/gshadow

Rationale:

The /etc/gshadow file contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security.

Remediation script:
chown root /etc/gshadow

Verify Group Who Owns gshadow Filerule

To properly set the group owner of /etc/gshadow, run the command:

$ sudo chgrp root /etc/gshadow

Rationale:

The /etc/gshadow file contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security.

Remediation script:
chgrp root /etc/gshadow

Verify Permissions on gshadow Filerule

To properly set the permissions of /etc/gshadow, run the command:

$ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/gshadow

Rationale:

The /etc/gshadow file contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security.

Remediation script:
chmod 0000 /etc/gshadow

Verify User Who Owns passwd Filerule

To properly set the owner of /etc/passwd, run the command:

$ sudo chown root /etc/passwd

Rationale:

The /etc/passwd file contains information about the users that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is critical for system security.

Remediation script:
chown root /etc/passwd

Verify Group Who Owns passwd Filerule

To properly set the group owner of /etc/passwd, run the command:

$ sudo chgrp root /etc/passwd

Rationale:

The /etc/passwd file contains information about the users that are configured on the system. Protection of this file is critical for system security.

Remediation script:
chgrp root /etc/passwd

Verify Permissions on passwd Filerule

To properly set the permissions of /etc/passwd, run the command:

$ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/passwd

Rationale:

If the /etc/passwd file is writable by a group-owner or the world the risk of its compromise is increased. The file contains the list of accounts on the system and associated information, and protection of this file is critical for system security.

Remediation script:
chmod 0644 /etc/passwd

Verify File Permissions Within Some Important Directoriesgroup

Some directories contain files whose confidentiality or integrity is notably important and may also be susceptible to misconfiguration over time, particularly if unpackaged software is installed. As such, an argument exists to verify that files' permissions within these directories remain configured correctly and restrictively.

contains 3 rules

Verify that Shared Library Files Have Root Ownershiprule

System-wide shared library files, which are linked to executables during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories by default:

/lib
/lib64
/usr/lib
/usr/lib64
Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are also stored in /lib/modules. All files in these directories should be owned by the root user. If the directory, or any file in these directories, is found to be owned by a user other than root correct its ownership with the following command:
$ sudo chown root FILE

Rationale:

Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at runtime. Proper ownership is necessary to protect the integrity of the system.

Remediation script:
for LIBDIR in /usr/lib /usr/lib64 /lib /lib64
do
  if [ -d $LIBDIR ]
  then
    find -L $LIBDIR \! -user root -exec chown root {} \; 
  fi
done

Verify that System Executables Have Restrictive Permissionsrule

System executables are stored in the following directories by default:

/bin
/sbin
/usr/bin
/usr/libexec
/usr/local/bin
/usr/local/sbin
/usr/sbin
All files in these directories should not be group-writable or world-writable. If any file FILE in these directories is found to be group-writable or world-writable, correct its permission with the following command:
$ sudo chmod go-w FILE

Rationale:

System binaries are executed by privileged users, as well as system services, and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure execution of these programs cannot be co-opted.

Remediation script:
DIRS="/bin /usr/bin /usr/local/bin /sbin /usr/sbin /usr/local/sbin /usr/libexec"
for dirPath in $DIRS; do
	find "$dirPath" -perm /022 -exec chmod go-w '{}' \;
done

Verify that System Executables Have Root Ownershiprule

System executables are stored in the following directories by default:

/bin
/sbin
/usr/bin
/usr/libexec
/usr/local/bin
/usr/local/sbin
/usr/sbin
All files in these directories should be owned by the root user. If any file FILE in these directories is found to be owned by a user other than root, correct its ownership with the following command:
$ sudo chown root FILE

Rationale:

System binaries are executed by privileged users as well as system services, and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure that their execution of these programs cannot be co-opted.

Remediation script:
find /bin/ \
/usr/bin/ \
/usr/local/bin/ \
/sbin/ \
/usr/sbin/ \
/usr/local/sbin/ \
/usr/libexec \
\! -user root -execdir chown root {} \;

Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Setrule

When the so-called 'sticky bit' is set on a directory, only the owner of a given file may remove that file from the directory. Without the sticky bit, any user with write access to a directory may remove any file in the directory. Setting the sticky bit prevents users from removing each other's files. In cases where there is no reason for a directory to be world-writable, a better solution is to remove that permission rather than to set the sticky bit. However, if a directory is used by a particular application, consult that application's documentation instead of blindly changing modes.
To set the sticky bit on a world-writable directory DIR, run the following command:

$ sudo chmod +t DIR

Rationale:

Failing to set the sticky bit on public directories allows unauthorized users to delete files in the directory structure.

The only authorized public directories are those temporary directories supplied with the system, or those designed to be temporary file repositories. The setting is normally reserved for directories used by the system, by users for temporary file storage (such as /tmp), and for directories requiring global read/write access.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6, 1.1.17, Test attestation on 20120929 by swells

Ensure No World-Writable Files Existrule

It is generally a good idea to remove global (other) write access to a file when it is discovered. However, check with documentation for specific applications before making changes. Also, monitor for recurring world-writable files, as these may be symptoms of a misconfigured application or user account.

Rationale:

Data in world-writable files can be modified by any user on the system. In almost all circumstances, files can be configured using a combination of user and group permissions to support whatever legitimate access is needed without the risk caused by world-writable files.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6

Ensure All Files Are Owned by a Userrule

If any files are not owned by a user, then the cause of their lack of ownership should be investigated. Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an appropriate user.

Rationale:

Unowned files do not directly imply a security problem, but they are generally a sign that something is amiss. They may be caused by an intruder, by incorrect software installation or draft software removal, or by failure to remove all files belonging to a deleted account. The files should be repaired so they will not cause problems when accounts are created in the future, and the cause should be discovered and addressed.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6, CM-6(b), 366, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, RHEL-07-020360

Ensure All Files Are Owned by a Grouprule

If any files are not owned by a group, then the cause of their lack of group-ownership should be investigated. Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an appropriate group.

Rationale:

Unowned files do not directly imply a security problem, but they are generally a sign that something is amiss. They may be caused by an intruder, by incorrect software installation or draft software removal, or by failure to remove all files belonging to a deleted account. The files should be repaired so they will not cause problems when accounts are created in the future, and the cause should be discovered and addressed.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6, IA-2, 366, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, RHEL-07-020370

Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by a System Accountrule

All directories in local partitions which are world-writable should be owned by root or another system account. If any world-writable directories are not owned by a system account, this should be investigated. Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an appropriate group.

Rationale:

Allowing a user account to own a world-writable directory is undesirable because it allows the owner of that directory to remove or replace any files that may be placed in the directory by other users.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6, Test attestation on 20120929 by swells

Restrict Programs from Dangerous Execution Patternsgroup

The recommendations in this section are designed to ensure that the system's features to protect against potentially dangerous program execution are activated. These protections are applied at the system initialization or kernel level, and defend against certain types of badly-configured or compromised programs.

contains 1 rule

Daemon Umaskgroup

The umask is a per-process setting which limits the default permissions for creation of new files and directories. The system includes initialization scripts which set the default umask for system daemons.

contains 1 rule

Set Daemon Umaskrule

The file /etc/init.d/functions includes initialization parameters for most or all daemons started at boot time. The default umask of 022 prevents creation of group- or world-writable files. To set the default umask for daemons, edit the following line, inserting 022 or 027 for UMASK appropriately:

umask 022
Setting the umask to too restrictive a setting can cause serious errors at runtime. Many daemons on the system already individually restrict themselves to a umask of 077 in their own init scripts.

Rationale:

The umask influences the permissions assigned to files created by a process at run time. An unnecessarily permissive umask could result in files being created with insecure permissions.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6, 3.1, Test attestation on 20140912 by JL

Remediation script:

var_umask_for_daemons="022"

grep -q ^umask /etc/init.d/functions && \
  sed -i "s/umask.*/umask $var_umask_for_daemons/g" /etc/init.d/functions
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
    echo "umask $var_umask_for_daemons" >> /etc/init.d/functions
fi

SELinuxgroup

SELinux is a feature of the Linux kernel which can be used to guard against misconfigured or compromised programs. SELinux enforces the idea that programs should be limited in what files they can access and what actions they can take.

The default SELinux policy, as configured on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, has been sufficiently developed and debugged that it should be usable on almost any Red Hat machine with minimal configuration and a small amount of system administrator training. This policy prevents system services - including most of the common network-visible services such as mail servers, FTP servers, and DNS servers - from accessing files which those services have no valid reason to access. This action alone prevents a huge amount of possible damage from network attacks against services, from trojaned software, and so forth.

This guide recommends that SELinux be enabled using the default (targeted) policy on every Red Hat system, unless that system has unusual requirements which make a stronger policy appropriate.

contains 4 rules

Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grubrule

SELinux can be disabled at boot time by an argument in /etc/default/grub. Remove any instances of selinux=0 from the kernel arguments in that file to prevent SELinux from being disabled at boot.

Rationale:

Disabling a major host protection feature, such as SELinux, at boot time prevents it from confining system services at boot time. Further, it increases the chances that it will remain off during system operation.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-3, AC-3(3), AC-6, AU-9, 22, 32, 1.4.1, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/selinux=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/*
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/enforcing=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/*

Ensure SELinux State is Enforcingrule

The SELinux state should be set to enforcing at system boot time. In the file /etc/selinux/config, add or correct the following line to configure the system to boot into enforcing mode:

SELINUX=enforcing

Rationale:

Setting the SELinux state to enforcing ensures SELinux is able to confine potentially compromised processes to the security policy, which is designed to prevent them from causing damage to the system or further elevating their privileges.

Remediation script:

var_selinux_state="enforcing"

function replace_or_append {
  local config_file=$1
  local key=$2
  local value=$3
  local cce=$4
  local format=$5

  # Check sanity of the input
  if [ $# -lt "3" ]
  then
        echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
        echo
        echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
        echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
  fi

  # Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
  # Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
  if test -L $config_file; then
    sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
  else
    sed_command="sed -i"
  fi

  # Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
  # If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
  if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
    cce="CCE-${cce}"
  else
    cce="CCE"
  fi

  # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
  # adding any search characters to the config file.
  stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)

  # If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
  if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
    printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
  else
    formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
  fi

  # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
  if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
    $sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
  else
    echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
    echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
  fi

}

replace_or_append '/etc/sysconfig/selinux' '^SELINUX=' $var_selinux_state 'CCENUM' '%s=%s'

Configure SELinux Policyrule

The SELinux targeted policy is appropriate for general-purpose desktops and servers, as well as systems in many other roles. To configure the system to use this policy, add or correct the following line in /etc/selinux/config:

SELINUXTYPE=targeted
Other policies, such as mls, provide additional security labeling and greater confinement but are not compatible with many general-purpose use cases.

Rationale:

Setting the SELinux policy to targeted or a more specialized policy ensures the system will confine processes that are likely to be targeted for exploitation, such as network or system services. Note: During the development or debugging of SELinux modules, it is common to temporarily place non-production systems in permissive mode. In such temporary cases, SELinux policies should be developed, and once work is completed, the system should be reconfigured to targeted.

Remediation script:

var_selinux_policy_name="targeted"

function replace_or_append {
  local config_file=$1
  local key=$2
  local value=$3
  local cce=$4
  local format=$5

  # Check sanity of the input
  if [ $# -lt "3" ]
  then
        echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
        echo
        echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
        echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
  fi

  # Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
  # Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
  if test -L $config_file; then
    sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
  else
    sed_command="sed -i"
  fi

  # Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
  # If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
  if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
    cce="CCE-${cce}"
  else
    cce="CCE"
  fi

  # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
  # adding any search characters to the config file.
  stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)

  # If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
  if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
    printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
  else
    formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
  fi

  # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
  if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
    $sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
  else
    echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
    echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
  fi

}

replace_or_append '/etc/sysconfig/selinux' '^SELINUXTYPE=' $var_selinux_policy_name 'CCENUM' '%s=%s'

Ensure No Daemons are Unconfined by SELinuxrule

Daemons for which the SELinux policy does not contain rules will inherit the context of the parent process. Because daemons are launched during startup and descend from the init process, they inherit the initrc_t context.

To check for unconfined daemons, run the following command:

$ sudo ps -eZ | egrep "initrc" | egrep -vw "tr|ps|egrep|bash|awk" | tr ':' ' ' | awk '{ print $NF }'
It should produce no output in a well-configured system.

Rationale:

Daemons which run with the initrc_t context may cause AVC denials, or allow privileges that the daemon does not require.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6, AU-9, CM-7, 1.4.6

Account and Access Controlgroup

In traditional Unix security, if an attacker gains shell access to a certain login account, they can perform any action or access any file to which that account has access. Therefore, making it more difficult for unauthorized people to gain shell access to accounts, particularly to privileged accounts, is a necessary part of securing a system. This section introduces mechanisms for restricting access to accounts under Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.

contains 11 rules

Protect Accounts by Restricting Password-Based Logingroup

Conventionally, Unix shell accounts are accessed by providing a username and password to a login program, which tests these values for correctness using the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files. Password-based login is vulnerable to guessing of weak passwords, and to sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks against passwords entered over a network or at an insecure console. Therefore, mechanisms for accessing accounts by entering usernames and passwords should be restricted to those which are operationally necessary.

contains 5 rules

Restrict Root Loginsgroup

Direct root logins should be allowed only for emergency use. In normal situations, the administrator should access the system via a unique unprivileged account, and then use su or sudo to execute privileged commands. Discouraging administrators from accessing the root account directly ensures an audit trail in organizations with multiple administrators. Locking down the channels through which root can connect directly also reduces opportunities for password-guessing against the root account. The login program uses the file /etc/securetty to determine which interfaces should allow root logins. The virtual devices /dev/console and /dev/tty* represent the system consoles (accessible via the Ctrl-Alt-F1 through Ctrl-Alt-F6 keyboard sequences on a default installation). The default securetty file also contains /dev/vc/*. These are likely to be deprecated in most environments, but may be retained for compatibility. Root should also be prohibited from connecting via network protocols. Other sections of this document include guidance describing how to prevent root from logging in via SSH.

contains 3 rules

Restrict Serial Port Root Loginsrule

To restrict root logins on serial ports, ensure lines of this form do not appear in /etc/securetty:

ttyS0
ttyS1

Rationale:

Preventing direct root login to serial port interfaces helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the systems using the root account.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6(2), 770, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
sed -i '/ttyS/d' /etc/securetty

Verify Only Root Has UID 0rule

If any account other than root has a UID of 0, this misconfiguration should be investigated and the accounts other than root should be removed or have their UID changed.
If the account is associated with system commands or applications the UID should be changed to one greater than "0" but less than "1000." Otherwise assign a UID greater than "1000" that has not already been assigned.

Rationale:

An account has root authority if it has a UID of 0. Multiple accounts with a UID of 0 afford more opportunity for potential intruders to guess a password for a privileged account. Proper configuration of sudo is recommended to afford multiple system administrators access to root privileges in an accountable manner.

Remediation script:
awk -F: '$3 == 0 && $1 != "root" { print $1 }' /etc/passwd | xargs passwd -l
contains 2 rules

Protect Accounts by Configuring PAMgroup

PAM, or Pluggable Authentication Modules, is a system which implements modular authentication for Linux programs. PAM provides a flexible and configurable architecture for authentication, and it should be configured to minimize exposure to unnecessary risk. This section contains guidance on how to accomplish that.

PAM is implemented as a set of shared objects which are loaded and invoked whenever an application wishes to authenticate a user. Typically, the application must be running as root in order to take advantage of PAM, because PAM's modules often need to be able to access sensitive stores of account information, such as /etc/shadow. Traditional privileged network listeners (e.g. sshd) or SUID programs (e.g. sudo) already meet this requirement. An SUID root application, userhelper, is provided so that programs which are not SUID or privileged themselves can still take advantage of PAM.

PAM looks in the directory /etc/pam.d for application-specific configuration information. For instance, if the program login attempts to authenticate a user, then PAM's libraries follow the instructions in the file /etc/pam.d/login to determine what actions should be taken.

One very important file in /etc/pam.d is /etc/pam.d/system-auth. This file, which is included by many other PAM configuration files, defines 'default' system authentication measures. Modifying this file is a good way to make far-reaching authentication changes, for instance when implementing a centralized authentication service.

warning  Be careful when making changes to PAM's configuration files. The syntax for these files is complex, and modifications can have unexpected consequences. The default configurations shipped with applications should be sufficient for most users.
warning  Running authconfig or system-config-authentication will re-write the PAM configuration files, destroying any manually made changes and replacing them with a series of system defaults. One reference to the configuration file syntax can be found at http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/Linux-PAM-html/sag-configuration-file.html.
contains 3 rules

Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attemptsgroup

The pam_faillock PAM module provides the capability to lock out user accounts after a number of failed login attempts. Its documentation is available in /usr/share/doc/pam-VERSION/txts/README.pam_faillock.

warning  Locking out user accounts presents the risk of a denial-of-service attack. The lockout policy must weigh whether the risk of such a denial-of-service attack outweighs the benefits of thwarting password guessing attacks.
contains 3 rules

Set Deny For Failed Password Attemptsrule

To configure the system to lock out accounts after a number of incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so, modify the content of both /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth as follows:

  • add the following line immediately before the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
    auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent deny=3 unlock_time=900 fail_interval=900
  • add the following line immediately after the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
    auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail deny=3 unlock_time=900 fail_interval=900
  • add the following line immediately before the pam_unix.so statement in the ACCOUNT section:
    account required pam_faillock.so

Rationale:

Locking out user accounts after a number of incorrect attempts prevents direct password guessing attacks.

Remediation script:

var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny="3"

AUTH_FILES[0]="/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
AUTH_FILES[1]="/etc/pam.d/password-auth"

for pamFile in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
	
	# pam_faillock.so already present?
	if grep -q "^auth.*pam_faillock.so.*" $pamFile; then

		# pam_faillock.so present, deny directive present?
		if grep -q "^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*deny=" $pamFile; then

			# both pam_faillock.so & deny present, just correct deny directive value
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\(deny *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny/" $pamFile
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*\)\(deny *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny/" $pamFile

		# pam_faillock.so present, but deny directive not yet
		else

			# append correct deny value to appropriate places
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ deny=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny/" $pamFile
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ deny=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny/" $pamFile
		fi

	# pam_faillock.so not present yet
	else

		# insert pam_faillock.so preauth & authfail rows with proper value of the 'deny' option
		sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth silent deny=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny" $pamFile
		sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/a auth        [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail deny=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny" $pamFile
		sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^account.*required.*pam_unix.so/i account     required      pam_faillock.so" $pamFile
	fi
done

Set Lockout Time For Failed Password Attemptsrule

To configure the system to lock out accounts after a number of incorrect login attempts and require an administrator to unlock the account using pam_faillock.so, modify the content of both /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth as follows:

  • add the following line immediately before the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
    auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent deny=3 unlock_time=900 fail_interval=900
  • add the following line immediately after the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
    auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail deny=3 unlock_time=900 fail_interval=900
  • add the following line immediately before the pam_unix.so statement in the ACCOUNT section:
    account required pam_faillock.so

Rationale:

Locking out user accounts after a number of incorrect attempts prevents direct password guessing attacks. Ensuring that an administrator is involved in unlocking locked accounts draws appropriate attention to such situations.

Remediation script:

var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time="900"

AUTH_FILES[0]="/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
AUTH_FILES[1]="/etc/pam.d/password-auth"

for pamFile in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
	
	# pam_faillock.so already present?
	if grep -q "^auth.*pam_faillock.so.*" $pamFile; then

		# pam_faillock.so present, unlock_time directive present?
		if grep -q "^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*unlock_time=" $pamFile; then

			# both pam_faillock.so & unlock_time present, just correct unlock_time directive value
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\(unlock_time *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time/" $pamFile
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*\)\(unlock_time *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time/" $pamFile

		# pam_faillock.so present, but unlock_time directive not yet
		else

			# append correct unlock_time value to appropriate places
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ unlock_time=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time/" $pamFile
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ unlock_time=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time/" $pamFile
		fi

	# pam_faillock.so not present yet
	else

		# insert pam_faillock.so preauth & authfail rows with proper value of the 'unlock_time' option
		sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth silent unlock_time=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time" $pamFile
		sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/a auth        [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail unlock_time=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time" $pamFile
		sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^account.*required.*pam_unix.so/i account     required      pam_faillock.so" $pamFile
	fi
done

Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attemptsrule

Utilizing pam_faillock.so, the fail_interval directive configures the system to lock out accounts after a number of incorrect login attempts. Modify the content of both /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth as follows:

  • add the following line immediately before the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
    auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent deny=3 unlock_time=900 fail_interval=900
  • add the following line immediately after the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
    auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail deny=3 unlock_time=900 fail_interval=900
  • add the following line immediately before the pam_unix.so statement in the ACCOUNT section:
    account required pam_faillock.so

Rationale:

Locking out user accounts after a number of incorrect attempts within a specific period of time prevents direct password guessing attacks.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-7(a), 44, 21

Remediation script:

var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval="900"

AUTH_FILES[0]="/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
AUTH_FILES[1]="/etc/pam.d/password-auth"

for pamFile in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
	
	# pam_faillock.so already present?
	if grep -q "^auth.*pam_faillock.so.*" $pamFile; then

		# pam_faillock.so present, 'fail_interval' directive present?
		if grep -q "^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*fail_interval=" $pamFile; then

			# both pam_faillock.so & 'fail_interval' present, just correct 'fail_interval' directive value
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\(fail_interval *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval/" $pamFile
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*\)\(fail_interval *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval/" $pamFile

		# pam_faillock.so present, but 'fail_interval' directive not yet
		else

			# append correct 'fail_interval' value to appropriate places
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ fail_interval=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval/" $pamFile
			sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ fail_interval=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval/" $pamFile
		fi

	# pam_faillock.so not present yet
	else

		# insert pam_faillock.so preauth & authfail rows with proper value of the 'fail_interval' option
		sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/i auth        required      pam_faillock.so preauth silent fail_interval=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval" $pamFile
		sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/a auth        [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail fail_interval=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval" $pamFile
		sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^account.*required.*pam_unix.so/i account     required      pam_faillock.so" $pamFile
	fi
done

Warning Banners for System Accessesgroup

Each system should expose as little information about itself as possible.

System banners, which are typically displayed just before a login prompt, give out information about the service or the host's operating system. This might include the distribution name and the system kernel version, and the particular version of a network service. This information can assist intruders in gaining access to the system as it can reveal whether the system is running vulnerable software. Most network services can be configured to limit what information is displayed.

Many organizations implement security policies that require a system banner provide notice of the system's ownership, provide warning to unauthorized users, and remind authorized users of their consent to monitoring.

contains 3 rules
contains 2 rules

Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Bannerrule

To enable displaying a login warning banner in the GNOME Display Manager's login screen, the banner-message-enable setting must be set under an appropriate configuration file(s) in the /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d directory and locked in /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks directory to prevent user modification. After the settings have been set, run dconf update. To display a banner, this setting must be enabled, and the user must be prevented from making changes. The banner text must also be set.

Rationale:

Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. For U.S. Government systems, system use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist.

Modify the System Login Bannerrule

To configure the system login banner edit /etc/issue. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer. The DoD required text is either:

You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions:
-The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations.
-At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS.
-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose.
-This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or privacy.
-Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details.


OR:

I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't.

Rationale:

Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist.

Remediation script:

login_banner_text="--[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+--[\s\n]*This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]*using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]*authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]*monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]*system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]*if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]*system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]*enforcement[\s\n]+officials."

# There was a regular-expression matching various banners, needs to be expanded
expanded=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\][+*]/ /g;s/\\//g;s/[^-]- /\n\n-/g')
formatted=$(echo "$expanded" | fold -sw 80)

cat <<EOF >/etc/issue
$formatted
EOF

printf "\n" >> /etc/issue

Network Configuration and Firewallsgroup

Most machines must be connected to a network of some sort, and this brings with it the substantial risk of network attack. This section discusses the security impact of decisions about networking which must be made when configuring a system.

This section also discusses firewalls, network access controls, and other network security frameworks, which allow system-level rules to be written that can limit an attackers' ability to connect to your system. These rules can specify that network traffic should be allowed or denied from certain IP addresses, hosts, and networks. The rules can also specify which of the system's network services are available to particular hosts or networks.

contains 28 rules

Kernel Parameters Which Affect Networkinggroup

The sysctl utility is used to set parameters which affect the operation of the Linux kernel. Kernel parameters which affect networking and have security implications are described here.

contains 14 rules

Network Parameters for Hosts Onlygroup

If the system is not going to be used as a router, then setting certain kernel parameters ensure that the host will not perform routing of network traffic.

contains 3 rules

Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects by Defaultrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0

Rationale:

ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology.
The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-4, CM-7, SC-5, SC-7, 1551, 4.1.2, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i 's/^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0/g' /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects to 0 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects for All Interfacesrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0

Rationale:

ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology.
The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, SC-5(1), 1551, 4.1.2, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i 's/^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0/g' /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects to 0 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwardingrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_forward kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0

Rationale:

IP forwarding permits the kernel to forward packets from one network interface to another. The ability to forward packets between two networks is only appropriate for systems acting as routers.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, SC-5, 366, 4.1.1, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.ip_forward
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0

#
# If net.ipv4.ip_forward present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
#	else, add "net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.ip_forward /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i 's/^net.ipv4.ip_forward.*/net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0/g' /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.ip_forward to 0 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Network Related Kernel Runtime Parameters for Hosts and Routersgroup

Certain kernel parameters should be set for systems which are acting as either hosts or routers to improve the system's ability defend against certain types of IPv4 protocol attacks.

contains 11 rules

Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets for All Interfacesrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0

Rationale:

Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement applies only to the forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv4 forwarding is enabled and the system is functioning as a router. Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required.

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value="disabled"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route.*/net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects for All Interfacesrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0

Rationale:

ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the host's route table and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.
This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless absolutely required.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, SC-5, 1503, 1551, 4.2.2, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value="disabled"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects for All Interfacesrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0

Rationale:

Accepting "secure" ICMP redirects (from those gateways listed as default gateways) has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-4, CM-7, SC-5, 1503, 1551, 4.2.3, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value="1"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packetsrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians=1
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1

Rationale:

The presence of "martian" packets (which have impossible addresses) as well as spoofed packets, source-routed packets, and redirects could be a sign of nefarious network activity. Logging these packets enables this activity to be detected.

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value="1"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians.*/net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets By Defaultrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0

Rationale:

Source-routed packates allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures.
Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required, such as when IPv4 forwarding is enabled and the system is legitimately functioning as a router.

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value="0"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route.*/net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects By Defaultrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0

Rationale:

ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the host's route table and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.
This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless absolutely required.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-4, CM-7, SC-5, SC-7, 1551, 4.2.2, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value="0"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Defaultrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0

Rationale:

Accepting "secure" ICMP redirects (from those gateways listed as default gateways) has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-4, CM-7, SC-5, SC-7, 1551, 4.2.3, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value="1"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requestsrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=1
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1

Rationale:

Responding to broadcast (ICMP) echoes facilitates network mapping and provides a vector for amplification attacks.
Ignoring ICMP echo requests (pings) sent to broadcast or multicast addresses makes the system slightly more difficult to enumerate on the network.

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value="1"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value

#
# If net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.*/net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = $sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts to $sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = $sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responsesrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=1
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1

Rationale:

Ignoring bogus ICMP error responses reduces log size, although some activity would not be logged.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, SC-5, 4.2.6, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value="1"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value

#
# If net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses.*/net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = $sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses to $sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = $sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering for All Interfacesrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1

Rationale:

Enabling reverse path filtering drops packets with source addresses that should not have been able to be received on the interface they were received on. It should not be used on systems which are routers for complicated networks, but is helpful for end hosts and routers serving small networks.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-4, SC-5, SC-7, 1551, 4.2.7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value="1"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter.*/net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering by Defaultrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1

Rationale:

Enabling reverse path filtering drops packets with source addresses that should not have been able to be received on the interface they were received on. It should not be used on systems which are routers for complicated networks, but is helpful for end hosts and routers serving small networks.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-4, SC-5, SC-7, 4.2.7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value="1"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter.*/net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Wireless Networkinggroup

Wireless networking, such as 802.11 (WiFi) and Bluetooth, can present a security risk to sensitive or classified systems and networks. Wireless networking hardware is much more likely to be included in laptop or portable systems than in desktops or servers.

Removal of hardware provides the greatest assurance that the wireless capability remains disabled. Acquisition policies often include provisions to prevent the purchase of equipment that will be used in sensitive spaces and includes wireless capabilities. If it is impractical to remove the wireless hardware, and policy permits the device to enter sensitive spaces as long as wireless is disabled, efforts should instead focus on disabling wireless capability via software.

contains 4 rules

Disable Wireless Through Software Configurationgroup

If it is impossible to remove the wireless hardware from the device in question, disable as much of it as possible through software. The following methods can disable software support for wireless networking, but note that these methods do not prevent malicious software or careless users from re-activating the devices.

contains 4 rules

Disable WiFi or Bluetooth in BIOSrule

Some systems that include built-in wireless support offer the ability to disable the device through the BIOS. This is system-specific; consult your hardware manual or explore the BIOS setup during boot.

Rationale:

Disabling wireless support in the BIOS prevents easy activation of the wireless interface, generally requiring administrators to reboot the system first.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), AC-18(a), AC-18(d), AC-18(3), CM-7, 85

Deactivate Wireless Network Interfacesrule

Deactivating wireless network interfaces should prevent normal usage of the wireless capability.

First, identify the interfaces available with the command:

$ ifconfig -a
Additionally, the following command may be used to determine whether wireless support is included for a particular interface, though this may not always be a clear indicator:
$ iwconfig
After identifying any wireless interfaces (which may have names like wlan0, ath0, wifi0, em1 or eth0), deactivate the interface with the command:
$ sudo ifdown interface
These changes will only last until the next reboot. To disable the interface for future boots, remove the appropriate interface file from /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts:
$ sudo rm /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface

Rationale:

Wireless networking allows attackers within physical proximity to launch network-based attacks against systems, including those against local LAN protocols which were not designed with security in mind.

Disable Bluetooth Servicerule

The bluetooth service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable bluetooth.service
$ sudo service bluetooth stop

Rationale:

Disabling the bluetooth service prevents the system from attempting connections to Bluetooth devices, which entails some security risk. Nevertheless, variation in this risk decision may be expected due to the utility of Bluetooth connectivity and its limited range.

Remediation script:
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/bluetooth && \
	sed -i 's/disable.*/disable	= yes/gI' /etc/xinetd.d/bluetooth
#
# Disable bluetooth.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable bluetooth.service

#
# Stop bluetooth.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop bluetooth.service

Disable Bluetooth Kernel Modulesrule

The kernel's module loading system can be configured to prevent loading of the Bluetooth module. Add the following to the appropriate /etc/modprobe.d configuration file to prevent the loading of the Bluetooth module:

install bluetooth /bin/true

Rationale:

If Bluetooth functionality must be disabled, preventing the kernel from loading the kernel module provides an additional safeguard against its activation.

Remediation script:
echo "install bluetooth /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf

IPv6group

The system includes support for Internet Protocol version 6. A major and often-mentioned improvement over IPv4 is its enormous increase in the number of available addresses. Another important feature is its support for automatic configuration of many network settings.

contains 4 rules

Disable Support for IPv6 Unless Neededgroup

Despite configuration that suggests support for IPv6 has been disabled, link-local IPv6 address auto-configuration occurs even when only an IPv4 address is assigned. The only way to effectively prevent execution of the IPv6 networking stack is to instruct the system not to activate the IPv6 kernel module.

contains 2 rules

Disable IPv6 Networking Support Automatic Loadingrule

To disable support for (ipv6) add the following line to /etc/sysctl.d/ipv6.conf (or another file in /etc/sysctl.d):

net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
This disables IPv6 on all network interfaces as other services and system functionality require the IPv6 stack loaded to work.

Rationale:

Any unnecessary network stacks - including IPv6 - should be disabled, to reduce the vulnerability to exploitation.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1551, 4.4.2, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Disable Support for RPC IPv6rule

RPC services for NFSv4 try to load transport modules for udp6 and tcp6 by default, even if IPv6 has been disabled in /etc/modprobe.d. To prevent RPC services such as rpc.mountd from attempting to start IPv6 network listeners, remove or comment out the following two lines in /etc/netconfig:

udp6       tpi_clts      v     inet6    udp     -       -
tcp6       tpi_cots_ord  v     inet6    tcp     -       -

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Configure IPv6 Settings if Necessarygroup

A major feature of IPv6 is the extent to which systems implementing it can automatically configure their networking devices using information from the network. From a security perspective, manually configuring important configuration information is preferable to accepting it from the network in an unauthenticated fashion.

contains 2 rules

Disable Automatic Configurationgroup

Disable the system's acceptance of router advertisements and redirects by adding or correcting the following line in /etc/sysconfig/network (note that this does not disable sending router solicitations):

IPV6_AUTOCONF=no

contains 2 rules

Configure Accepting IPv6 Router Advertisementsrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = 0

Rationale:

An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 4.4.1.1

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value="0"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra=$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value

#
# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra.*/net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = $sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra to $sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = $sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

Configure Accepting IPv6 Redirects By Defaultrule

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command:

$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf:
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0

Rationale:

An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1551, 4.4.1.2

Remediation script:

sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value="0"

#
# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects=$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value

#
# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
	sed -i "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects.*/net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects to $sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
	echo "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi

firewalldgroup

The dynamic firewall daemon firewalld provides a dynamically managed firewall with support for network “zones” to assign a level of trust to a network and its associated connections and interfaces. It has support for IPv4 and IPv6 firewall settings. It supports Ethernet bridges and has a separation of runtime and permanent configuration options. It also has an interface for services or applications to add firewall rules directly.
A graphical configuration tool, firewall-config, is used to configure firewalld, which in turn uses iptables tool to communicate with Netfilter in the kernel which implements packet filtering.
The firewall service provided by firewalld is dynamic rather than static because changes to the configuration can be made at anytime and are immediately implemented. There is no need to save or apply the changes. No unintended disruption of existing network connections occurs as no part of the firewall has to be reloaded.

contains 2 rules

Inspect and Activate Default firewalld Rulesgroup

Firewalls can be used to separate networks into different zones based on the level of trust the user has decided to place on the devices and traffic within that network. NetworkManager informs firewalld to which zone an interface belongs. An interface's assigned zone can be changed by NetworkManager or via the firewall-config tool.
The zone settings in /etc/firewalld/ are a range of preset settings which can be quickly applied to a network interface. These are the zones provided by firewalld sorted according to the default trust level of the zones from untrusted to trusted:

  • drop

    Any incoming network packets are dropped, there is no reply. Only outgoing network connections are possible.

  • block

    Any incoming network connections are rejected with an icmp-host-prohibited message for IPv4 and icmp6-adm-prohibited for IPv6. Only network connections initiated from within the system are possible.

  • public

    For use in public areas. You do not trust the other computers on the network to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • external

    For use on external networks with masquerading enabled especially for routers. You do not trust the other computers on the network to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • dmz

    For computers in your demilitarized zone that are publicly-accessible with limited access to your internal network. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • work

    For use in work areas. You mostly trust the other computers on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • home

    For use in home areas. You mostly trust the other computers on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • internal

    For use on internal networks. You mostly trust the other computers on the networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • trusted

    All network connections are accepted.


It is possible to designate one of these zones to be the default zone. When interface connections are added to NetworkManager, they are assigned to the default zone. On installation, the default zone in firewalld is set to be the public zone.
To find out all the settings of a zone, for example the public zone, enter the following command as root:
# firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all
Example output of this command might look like the following:
# firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all
public
  interfaces:
  services: mdns dhcpv6-client ssh
  ports:
  forward-ports:
  icmp-blocks: source-quench
To view the network zones currently active, enter the following command as root:
# firewall-cmd --get-service
The following listing displays the result of this command on common Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Server system:
# firewall-cmd --get-service
amanda-client bacula bacula-client dhcp dhcpv6 dhcpv6-client dns ftp
high-availability http https imaps ipp ipp-client ipsec kerberos kpasswd
ldap ldaps libvirt libvirt-tls mdns mountd ms-wbt mysql nfs ntp openvpn
pmcd pmproxy pmwebapi pmwebapis pop3s postgresql proxy-dhcp radius rpc-bind
samba samba-client smtp ssh telnet tftp tftp-client transmission-client
vnc-server wbem-https
Finally to view the network zones that will be active after the next firewalld service reload, enter the following command as root:
# firewall-cmd --get-service --permanent

contains 1 rule

Verify firewalld Enabledrule

The firewalld service can be enabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl enable firewalld.service

Rationale:

Access control methods provide the ability to enhance system security posture by restricting services and known good IP addresses and address ranges. This prevents connections from unknown hosts and protocols.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-6(b), 366, 4.7, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, RHEL-07-040810

Remediation script:
#
# Enable firewalld.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl enable firewalld.service

#
# Start firewalld.service if not currently running
#
systemctl start firewalld.service

Strengthen the Default Rulesetgroup

The default rules can be strengthened. The system scripts that activate the firewall rules expect them to be defined in configuration files under the /etc/firewalld/services and /etc/firewalld/zones directories.

The following recommendations describe how to strengthen the default ruleset configuration file. An alternative to editing this configuration file is to create a shell script that makes calls to the firewall-cmd program to load in rules under the /etc/firewalld/services and /etc/firewalld/zones directories.

Instructions apply to both unless otherwise noted. Language and address conventions for regular firewalld rules are used throughout this section.

warning  The program firewall-config allows additional services to penetrate the default firewall rules and automatically adjusts the firewalld ruleset(s).
contains 1 rule

Set Default firewalld Zone for Incoming Packetsrule

To set the default zone to drop for the built-in default zone which processes incoming IPv4 and IPv6 packets, modify the following line in /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf to be:

DefaultZone=drop

Rationale:

In firewalld the default zone is applied only after all the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the default zone to drop implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be accepted.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 66, 1109, 1154, 1414

Remediation script:
grep -q ^DefaultZone= /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf && \
  sed -i "s/DefaultZone=.*/DefaultZone=drop/g" /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
    echo "DefaultZone=drop" >> /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf
fi

Uncommon Network Protocolsgroup

The system includes support for several network protocols which are not commonly used. Although security vulnerabilities in kernel networking code are not frequently discovered, the consequences can be dramatic. Ensuring uncommon network protocols are disabled reduces the system's risk to attacks targeted at its implementation of those protocols.

warning  Although these protocols are not commonly used, avoid disruption in your network environment by ensuring they are not needed prior to disabling them.
contains 2 rules

Disable DCCP Supportrule

The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) is a relatively new transport layer protocol, designed to support streaming media and telephony. To configure the system to prevent the dccp kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install dccp /bin/true

Rationale:

Disabling DCCP protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation.

Remediation script:
echo "install dccp /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/dccp.conf

Disable SCTP Supportrule

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a transport layer protocol, designed to support the idea of message-oriented communication, with several streams of messages within one connection. To configure the system to prevent the sctp kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d:

install sctp /bin/true

Rationale:

Disabling SCTP protects the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation.

Remediation script:
echo "install sctp /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf

Disable Zeroconf Networkingrule

Zeroconf networking allows the system to assign itself an IP address and engage in IP communication without a statically-assigned address or even a DHCP server. Automatic address assignment via Zeroconf (or DHCP) is not recommended. To disable Zeroconf automatic route assignment in the 169.254.0.0 subnet, add or correct the following line in /etc/sysconfig/network:

NOZEROCONF=yes

Rationale:

Zeroconf addresses are in the network 169.254.0.0. The networking scripts add entries to the system's routing table for these addresses. Zeroconf address assignment commonly occurs when the system is configured to use DHCP but fails to receive an address assignment from the DHCP server.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Remediation script:
echo "NOZEROCONF=yes" >> /etc/sysconfig/network

Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Snifferrule

The system should not be acting as a network sniffer, which can capture all traffic on the network to which it is connected. Run the following to determine if any interface is running in promiscuous mode:

$ ip link | grep PROMISC

Rationale:

If any results are returned, then a sniffing process (such as tcpdump or Wireshark) is likely to be using the interface and this should be investigated.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, MA-3

Configure Sysloggroup

The syslog service has been the default Unix logging mechanism for many years. It has a number of downsides, including inconsistent log format, lack of authentication for received messages, and lack of authentication, encryption, or reliable transport for messages sent over a network. However, due to its long history, syslog is a de facto standard which is supported by almost all Unix applications.

In Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, rsyslog has replaced ksyslogd as the syslog daemon of choice, and it includes some additional security features such as reliable, connection-oriented (i.e. TCP) transmission of logs, the option to log to database formats, and the encryption of log data en route to a central logging server. This section discusses how to configure rsyslog for best effect, and how to use tools provided with the system to maintain and monitor logs.

contains 5 rules

Ensure Proper Configuration of Log Filesgroup

The file /etc/rsyslog.conf controls where log message are written. These are controlled by lines called rules, which consist of a selector and an action. These rules are often customized depending on the role of the system, the requirements of the environment, and whatever may enable the administrator to most effectively make use of log data. The default rules in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 are:

*.info;mail.none;authpriv.none;cron.none                /var/log/messages
authpriv.*                                              /var/log/secure
mail.*                                                  -/var/log/maillog
cron.*                                                  /var/log/cron
*.emerg                                                 *
uucp,news.crit                                          /var/log/spooler
local7.*                                                /var/log/boot.log
See the man page rsyslog.conf(5) for more information. Note that the rsyslog daemon can be configured to use a timestamp format that some log processing programs may not understand. If this occurs, edit the file /etc/rsyslog.conf and add or edit the following line:
$ ActionFileDefaultTemplate RSYSLOG_TraditionalFileFormat

contains 2 rules

Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Userrule

The owner of all log files written by rsyslog should be root. These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. For each log file LOGFILE referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf, run the following command to inspect the file's owner:

$ ls -l LOGFILE
If the owner is not root, run the following command to correct this:
$ sudo chown root LOGFILE

Rationale:

The log files generated by rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Log files should be protected from unauthorized access.

Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Grouprule

The group-owner of all log files written by rsyslog should be root. These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. For each log file LOGFILE referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf, run the following command to inspect the file's group owner:

$ ls -l LOGFILE
If the owner is not root, run the following command to correct this:
$ sudo chgrp root LOGFILE

Rationale:

The log files generated by rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Log files should be protected from unauthorized access.

Rsyslog Logs Sent To Remote Hostgroup

If system logs are to be useful in detecting malicious activities, it is necessary to send logs to a remote server. An intruder who has compromised the root account on a machine may delete the log entries which indicate that the system was attacked before they are seen by an administrator.

However, it is recommended that logs be stored on the local host in addition to being sent to the loghost, especially if rsyslog has been configured to use the UDP protocol to send messages over a network. UDP does not guarantee reliable delivery, and moderately busy sites will lose log messages occasionally, especially in periods of high traffic which may be the result of an attack. In addition, remote rsyslog messages are not authenticated in any way by default, so it is easy for an attacker to introduce spurious messages to the central log server. Also, some problems cause loss of network connectivity, which will prevent the sending of messages to the central server. For all of these reasons, it is better to store log messages both centrally and on each host, so that they can be correlated if necessary.

contains 1 rule

Ensure Logs Sent To Remote Hostrule

To configure rsyslog to send logs to a remote log server, open /etc/rsyslog.conf and read and understand the last section of the file, which describes the multiple directives necessary to activate remote logging. Along with these other directives, the system can be configured to forward its logs to a particular log server by adding or correcting one of the following lines, substituting loghost.example.com appropriately. The choice of protocol depends on the environment of the system; although TCP and RELP provide more reliable message delivery, they may not be supported in all environments.
To use UDP for log message delivery:

*.* @loghost.example.com

To use TCP for log message delivery:
*.* @@loghost.example.com

To use RELP for log message delivery:
*.* :omrelp:loghost.example.com

Rationale:

A log server (loghost) receives syslog messages from one or more systems. This data can be used as an additional log source in the event a system is compromised and its local logs are suspect. Forwarding log messages to a remote loghost also provides system administrators with a centralized place to view the status of multiple hosts within the enterprise.

identifiers: 

references:  AU-3(2), AU-4(1), AU-9, 1348, 136, 1851, 5.1.5

Ensure rsyslog is Installedrule

Rsyslog is installed by default. The rsyslog package can be installed with the following command:

$ sudo yum install rsyslog

Rationale:

The rsyslog package provides the rsyslog daemon, which provides system logging services.

identifiers: 

references:  AU-9(2), 1311, 1312, 5.1.1, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
yum -y install rsyslog

Enable rsyslog Servicerule

The rsyslog service provides syslog-style logging by default on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7. The rsyslog service can be enabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl enable rsyslog.service

Rationale:

The rsyslog service must be running in order to provide logging services, which are essential to system administration.

Remediation script:
#
# Enable rsyslog.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl enable rsyslog.service

#
# Start rsyslog.service if not currently running
#
systemctl start rsyslog.service

System Accounting with auditdgroup

The audit service provides substantial capabilities for recording system activities. By default, the service audits about SELinux AVC denials and certain types of security-relevant events such as system logins, account modifications, and authentication events performed by programs such as sudo. Under its default configuration, auditd has modest disk space requirements, and should not noticeably impact system performance.
NOTE: The Linux Audit daemon auditd can be configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules files (*.rules) located in /etc/audit/rules.d location and compile them to create the resulting form of the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during the daemon startup (default configuration). Alternatively, the auditd daemon can use the auditctl utility to read audit rules from the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during daemon startup, and load them into the kernel. The expected behavior is configured via the appropriate ExecStartPost directive setting in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. To instruct the auditd daemon to use the augenrules program to read audit rules (default configuration), use the following setting:

ExecStartPost=-/sbin/augenrules --load
in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. In order to instruct the auditd daemon to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules, use the following setting:
ExecStartPost=-/sbin/auditctl -R /etc/audit/audit.rules
in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. Refer to [Service] section of the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file for further details.
Government networks often have substantial auditing requirements and auditd can be configured to meet these requirements. Examining some example audit records demonstrates how the Linux audit system satisfies common requirements. The following example from Fedora Documentation available at https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/SELinux_Users_and_Administrators_Guide/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Troubleshooting-Fixing_Problems.html#sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Fixing_Problems-Raw_Audit_Messages shows the substantial amount of information captured in a two typical "raw" audit messages, followed by a breakdown of the most important fields. In this example the message is SELinux-related and reports an AVC denial (and the associated system call) that occurred when the Apache HTTP Server attempted to access the /var/www/html/file1 file (labeled with the samba_share_t type):
type=AVC msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): avc:  denied  { getattr } for pid=2465 comm="httpd"
path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0 ino=284133 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): arch=40000003 syscall=196 success=no exit=-13
a0=b98df198 a1=bfec85dc a2=54dff4 a3=2008171 items=0 ppid=2463 pid=2465 auid=502 uid=48
gid=48 euid=48 suid=48 fsuid=48 egid=48 sgid=48 fsgid=48 tty=(none) ses=6 comm="httpd"
exe="/usr/sbin/httpd" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 key=(null)
  • msg=audit(1226874073.147:96)
    • The number in parentheses is the unformatted time stamp (Epoch time) for the event, which can be converted to standard time by using the date command.
  • { getattr }
    • The item in braces indicates the permission that was denied. getattr indicates the source process was trying to read the target file's status information. This occurs before reading files. This action is denied due to the file being accessed having the wrong label. Commonly seen permissions include getattr, read, and write.
  • comm="httpd"
    • The executable that launched the process. The full path of the executable is found in the exe= section of the system call (SYSCALL) message, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd".
  • path="/var/www/html/file1"
    • The path to the object (target) the process attempted to access.
  • scontext="unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0"
    • The SELinux context of the process that attempted the denied action. In this case, it is the SELinux context of the Apache HTTP Server, which is running in the httpd_t domain.
  • tcontext="unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0"
    • The SELinux context of the object (target) the process attempted to access. In this case, it is the SELinux context of file1. Note: the samba_share_t type is not accessible to processes running in the httpd_t domain.
  • From the system call (SYSCALL) message, two items are of interest:
    • success=no: indicates whether the denial (AVC) was enforced or not. success=no indicates the system call was not successful (SELinux denied access). success=yes indicates the system call was successful - this can be seen for permissive domains or unconfined domains, such as initrc_t and kernel_t.
    • exe="/usr/sbin/httpd": the full path to the executable that launched the process, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd".

contains 41 rules

Configure auditd Data Retentiongroup

The audit system writes data to /var/log/audit/audit.log. By default, auditd rotates 5 logs by size (6MB), retaining a maximum of 30MB of data in total, and refuses to write entries when the disk is too full. This minimizes the risk of audit data filling its partition and impacting other services. This also minimizes the risk of the audit daemon temporarily disabling the system if it cannot write audit log (which it can be configured to do). For a busy system or a system which is thoroughly auditing system activity, the default settings for data retention may be insufficient. The log file size needed will depend heavily on what types of events are being audited. First configure auditing to log all the events of interest. Then monitor the log size manually for awhile to determine what file size will allow you to keep the required data for the correct time period.

Using a dedicated partition for /var/log/audit prevents the auditd logs from disrupting system functionality if they fill, and, more importantly, prevents other activity in /var from filling the partition and stopping the audit trail. (The audit logs are size-limited and therefore unlikely to grow without bound unless configured to do so.) Some machines may have requirements that no actions occur which cannot be audited. If this is the case, then auditd can be configured to halt the machine if it runs out of space. Note: Since older logs are rotated, configuring auditd this way does not prevent older logs from being rotated away before they can be viewed. If your system is configured to halt when logging cannot be performed, make sure this can never happen under normal circumstances! Ensure that /var/log/audit is on its own partition, and that this partition is larger than the maximum amount of data auditd will retain normally.

references:  AU-11, 138

contains 7 rules

Configure auditd Number of Logs Retainedrule

Determine how many log files auditd should retain when it rotates logs. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting NUMLOGS with the correct value of 5:

num_logs = NUMLOGS
Set the value to 5 for general-purpose systems. Note that values less than 2 result in no log rotation.

Rationale:

The total storage for audit log files must be large enough to retain log information over the period required. This is a function of the maximum log file size and the number of logs retained.

Remediation script:

var_auditd_num_logs="5"

AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf

grep -q ^num_logs $AUDITCONFIG && \
  sed -i 's/^num_logs.*/num_logs = '"$var_auditd_num_logs"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
  echo "num_logs = $var_auditd_num_logs" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi

Configure auditd Max Log File Sizerule

Determine the amount of audit data (in megabytes) which should be retained in each log file. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting the correct value of 6 for STOREMB:

max_log_file = STOREMB
Set the value to 6 (MB) or higher for general-purpose systems. Larger values, of course, support retention of even more audit data.

Rationale:

The total storage for audit log files must be large enough to retain log information over the period required. This is a function of the maximum log file size and the number of logs retained.

Remediation script:

var_auditd_max_log_file="6"

AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf

grep -q ^max_log_file $AUDITCONFIG && \
  sed -i 's/^max_log_file.*/max_log_file = '"$var_auditd_max_log_file"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
  echo "max_log_file = $var_auditd_max_log_file" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi

Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Sizerule

The default action to take when the logs reach their maximum size is to rotate the log files, discarding the oldest one. To configure the action taken by auditd, add or correct the line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf:

max_log_file_action = ACTION
Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. These include:
  • ignore
  • syslog
  • suspend
  • rotate
  • keep_logs
Set the ACTION to rotate to ensure log rotation occurs. This is the default. The setting is case-insensitive.

Rationale:

Automatically rotating logs (by setting this to rotate) minimizes the chances of the system unexpectedly running out of disk space by being overwhelmed with log data. However, for systems that must never discard log data, or which use external processes to transfer it and reclaim space, keep_logs can be employed.

Remediation script:

var_auditd_max_log_file_action="rotate"

AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf

grep -q ^max_log_file_action $AUDITCONFIG && \
  sed -i 's/^max_log_file_action.*/max_log_file_action = '"$var_auditd_max_log_file_action"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
  echo "max_log_file_action = $var_auditd_max_log_file_action" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi

Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk Spacerule

The auditd service can be configured to take an action when disk space starts to run low. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately:

space_left_action = ACTION
Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. These include:
  • ignore
  • syslog
  • email
  • exec
  • suspend
  • single
  • halt
Set this to email (instead of the default, which is suspend) as it is more likely to get prompt attention. Acceptable values also include suspend, single, and halt.

Rationale:

Notifying administrators of an impending disk space problem may allow them to take corrective action prior to any disruption.

Remediation script:

var_auditd_space_left_action="email"

grep -q ^space_left_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf && \
  sed -i "s/space_left_action.*/space_left_action = $var_auditd_space_left_action/g" /etc/audit/auditd.conf
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
    echo "space_left_action = $var_auditd_space_left_action" >> /etc/audit/auditd.conf
fi

Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk Spacerule

The auditd service can be configured to take an action when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting ACTION appropriately:

admin_space_left_action = ACTION
Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single user mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include suspend and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page.

Rationale:

Administrators should be made aware of an inability to record audit records. If a separate partition or logical volume of adequate size is used, running low on space for audit records should never occur.

Remediation script:

var_auditd_admin_space_left_action="single"

grep -q ^admin_space_left_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf && \
  sed -i "s/admin_space_left_action.*/admin_space_left_action = $var_auditd_admin_space_left_action/g" /etc/audit/auditd.conf
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
    echo "admin_space_left_action = $var_auditd_admin_space_left_action" >> /etc/audit/auditd.conf
fi

Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk Spacerule

The auditd service can be configured to send email to a designated account in certain situations. Add or correct the following line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf to ensure that administrators are notified via email for those situations:

action_mail_acct = root

Rationale:

Email sent to the root account is typically aliased to the administrators of the system, who can take appropriate action.

identifiers: 

references:  AU-1(b), AU-4, AU-5(a), IR-5, 139, 144, Req-10.7.a, 5.2.1.2

Remediation script:

var_auditd_action_mail_acct="root"

AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf

grep -q ^action_mail_acct $AUDITCONFIG && \
  sed -i 's/^action_mail_acct.*/action_mail_acct = '"$var_auditd_action_mail_acct"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
  echo "action_mail_acct = $var_auditd_action_mail_acct" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi

Configure auditd to use audispd's syslog pluginrule

To configure the auditd service to use the syslog plug-in of the audispd audit event multiplexor, set the active line in /etc/audisp/plugins.d/syslog.conf to yes. Restart the auditd service:

$ sudo service auditd restart

Rationale:

The auditd service does not include the ability to send audit records to a centralized server for management directly. It does, however, include a plug-in for audit event multiplexor (audispd) to pass audit records to the local syslog server

identifiers: 

references:  AU-1(b), AU-3(2), IR-5, 136, Req-10.5.3

Remediation script:

grep -q ^active /etc/audisp/plugins.d/syslog.conf && \
  sed -i "s/active.*/active = yes/g" /etc/audisp/plugins.d/syslog.conf
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
    echo "active = yes" >> /etc/audisp/plugins.d/syslog.conf
fi

Configure auditd Rules for Comprehensive Auditinggroup

The auditd program can perform comprehensive monitoring of system activity. This section describes recommended configuration settings for comprehensive auditing, but a full description of the auditing system's capabilities is beyond the scope of this guide. The mailing list linux-audit@redhat.com exists to facilitate community discussion of the auditing system.

The audit subsystem supports extensive collection of events, including:

  • Tracing of arbitrary system calls (identified by name or number) on entry or exit.
  • Filtering by PID, UID, call success, system call argument (with some limitations), etc.
  • Monitoring of specific files for modifications to the file's contents or metadata.

Auditing rules at startup are controlled by the file /etc/audit/audit.rules. Add rules to it to meet the auditing requirements for your organization. Each line in /etc/audit/audit.rules represents a series of arguments that can be passed to auditctl and can be individually tested during runtime. See documentation in /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION and in the related man pages for more details.

If copying any example audit rulesets from /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION, be sure to comment out the lines containing arch= which are not appropriate for your system's architecture. Then review and understand the following rules, ensuring rules are activated as needed for the appropriate architecture.

After reviewing all the rules, reading the following sections, and editing as needed, the new rules can be activated as follows:
$ sudo service auditd restart

contains 32 rules

Records Events that Modify Date and Time Informationgroup

Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time. All changes to the system time should be audited.

contains 5 rules

Record attempts to alter time through adjtimexrule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -k audit_time_rules
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -k audit_time_rules
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -k audit_time_rules
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -k audit_time_rules
The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules

Rationale:

Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited.

Remediation script:

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
# 
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

function rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation {

# Perform the remediation for the 'adjtimex', 'settimeofday', and 'stime' audit
# system calls on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 or Fedora OSes
#
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do

        PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -k *"
        # Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture
        if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ]
        then
                # stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output)
                # so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
                GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\|stime\)"
                FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S stime -k audit_time_rules"
        elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ]
        then
                # stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output)
                # therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
                GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\)"
                FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules"
        fi
        # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
        fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
        fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

}

rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation

Record attempts to alter time through settimeofdayrule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules

Rationale:

Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited.

Remediation script:

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
# 
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

function rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation {

# Perform the remediation for the 'adjtimex', 'settimeofday', and 'stime' audit
# system calls on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 or Fedora OSes
#
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do

        PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -k *"
        # Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture
        if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ]
        then
                # stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output)
                # so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
                GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\|stime\)"
                FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S stime -k audit_time_rules"
        elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ]
        then
                # stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output)
                # therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
                GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\)"
                FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules"
        fi
        # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
        fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
        fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

}

rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation

Record Attempts to Alter Time Through stimerule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S stime -k audit_time_rules
Since the 64 bit version of the "stime" system call is not defined in the audit lookup table, the corresponding "-F arch=b64" form of this rule is not expected to be defined on 64 bit systems (the aforementioned "-F arch=b32" stime rule form itself is sufficient for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems). If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S stime -k audit_time_rules
Since the 64 bit version of the "stime" system call is not defined in the audit lookup table, the corresponding "-F arch=b64" form of this rule is not expected to be defined on 64 bit systems (the aforementioned "-F arch=b32" stime rule form itself is sufficient for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems). The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined system calls:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules

Rationale:

Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited.

Remediation script:

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
# 
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

function rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation {

# Perform the remediation for the 'adjtimex', 'settimeofday', and 'stime' audit
# system calls on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 or Fedora OSes
#
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do

        PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -k *"
        # Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture
        if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ]
        then
                # stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output)
                # so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
                GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\|stime\)"
                FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S stime -k audit_time_rules"
        elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ]
        then
                # stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output)
                # therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
                GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\)"
                FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules"
        fi
        # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
        fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
        fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

}

rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation

Record Attempts to Alter Time Through clock_settimerule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules

Rationale:

Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited.

Remediation script:


# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S clock_settime -F a0=.* \(-F key=\|-k \).*"
	GROUP="clock_settime"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -k time-change"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Attempts to Alter the localtime Filerule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules
The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport and should always be used.

Rationale:

Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes to the system time should be audited.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/localtime" "wa" "audit_time_rules"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/localtime" "wa" "audit_time_rules"

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controlsgroup

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. Note that the "-F arch=b32" lines should be present even on a 64 bit system. These commands identify system calls for auditing. Even if the system is 64 bit it can still execute 32 bit system calls. Additionally, these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. An example of this is that the "-S" calls could be split up and placed on separate lines, however, this is less efficient. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If your system is 64 bit then these lines should be duplicated and the arch=b32 replaced with arch=b64 as follows:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

contains 13 rules

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmodrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod  -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod  -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="chmod"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chownrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="chown"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="chmod"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodatrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="chmod"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="chown"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownatrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="chown"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fremovexattrrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="xattr"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fsetxattrrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="xattr"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lchownrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="chown"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lremovexattrrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="xattr"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lsetxattrrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="xattr"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - removexattrrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="xattr"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - setxattrrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod

warning  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:

The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="xattr"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Record Events that Modify User/Group Informationrule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes:

-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes:
-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification

Rationale:

In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/group" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/group" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/passwd" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/passwd" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/gshadow" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/gshadow" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/shadow" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/shadow" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/security/opasswd" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/security/opasswd" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"

Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environmentrule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system:

-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system:
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification

Rationale:

The network environment should not be modified by anything other than administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be audited.

Remediation script:


# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -k *"
	# Use escaped BRE regex to specify rule group
	GROUP="set\(host\|domain\)name"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

# Then perform the remediations for the watch rules
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/issue" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/issue" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/issue.net" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/issue.net" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/hosts" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/hosts" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/sysconfig/network" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/sysconfig/network" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"

System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0640 or Less Permissiverule

If log_group in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a group other than the root group account, change the mode of the audit log files with the following command:

$ sudo chmod 0640 audit_file

Otherwise, change the mode of the audit log files with the following command:
$ sudo chmod 0600 audit_file

Rationale:

If users can write to audit logs, audit trails can be modified or destroyed.

Remediation script:

if `grep -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf` ; then
  GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ')
  if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ] ; then
    chmod 0640 /var/log/audit/audit.log
    chmod 0440 /var/log/audit/audit.log.*
  else
    chmod 0600 /var/log/audit/audit.log
    chmod 0400 /var/log/audit/audit.log.*
  fi

  chmod 0640 /etc/audit/audit*
  chmod 0640 /etc/audit/rules.d/*
else
  chmod 0600 /var/log/audit/audit.log
  chmod 0400 /var/log/audit/audit.log.*
  chmod 0640 /etc/audit/audit*
  chmod 0640 /etc/audit/rules.d/*
fi

System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Rootrule

To properly set the owner of /var/log, run the command:

$ sudo chown root /var/log

Rationale:

Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality.

Remediation script:

if `grep -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf` ; then
  GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ')
  if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ] ; then
    chown root.${GROUP} /var/log/audit
    chown root.${GROUP} /var/log/audit/audit.log*
  else
    chown root.root /var/log/audit
    chown root.root /var/log/audit/audit.log*
  fi
else
  chown root.root /var/log/audit
  chown root.root /var/log/audit/audit.log*
fi

Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controlsrule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy

Rationale:

The system's mandatory access policy (SELinux) should not be arbitrarily changed by anything other than administrator action. All changes to MAC policy should be audited.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/selinux/" "wa" "MAC-policy"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/selinux/" "wa" "MAC-policy"

Record Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Informationrule

The audit system already collects process information for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing such process information:

-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing such process information:
-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session

Rationale:

Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/var/run/utmp" "wa" "session"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/var/run/utmp" "wa" "session"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/var/log/btmp" "wa" "session"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/var/log/btmp" "wa" "session"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/var/log/wtmp" "wa" "session"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/var/log/wtmp" "wa" "session"

Ensure auditd Collects Unauthorized Access Attempts to Files (unsuccessful)rule

At a minimum the audit system should collect unauthorized file accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access

Rationale:

Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do

	# First fix the -EACCES requirement
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	# Use escaped BRE regex to specify rule group
	GROUP="\(creat\|open\|truncate\)"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"

	# Then fix the -EPERM requirement
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	# No need to change content of $GROUP variable - it's the same as for -EACCES case above
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"

done

Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commandsrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. To find the relevant setuid / setgid programs, run the following command for each local partition PART:

$ sudo find PART -xdev -type f -perm -4000 -o -type f -perm -2000 2>/dev/null
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d for each setuid / setgid program on the system, replacing the SETUID_PROG_PATH part with the full path of that setuid / setgid program in the list:
-a always,exit -F path=SETUID_PROG_PATH -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k privileged
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following form to /etc/audit/audit.rules for each setuid / setgid program on the system, replacing the SETUID_PROG_PATH part with the full path of that setuid / setgid program in the list:
-a always,exit -F path=SETUID_PROG_PATH -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k privileged

Rationale:

Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the risk from insider and advanced persistent threast.
Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function perform_audit_rules_privileged_commands_remediation {
#
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local min_auid="$2"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
        echo "Usage: perform_audit_rules_privileged_commands_remediation 'auditctl | augenrules' '500 | 1000'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

declare -a files_to_inspect=()

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then:
# * add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'to the list of files to be inspected,
# * specify '/etc/audit/audit.rules' as the output audit file, where
#   missing rules should be inserted
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("/etc/audit/audit.rules")
        output_audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
#
# If the audit tool is 'augenrules', then:
# * add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list of files to be inspected
#   (split by newline),
# * specify /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules' as the output file, where
#   missing rules should be inserted
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        IFS=$'\n' files_to_inspect=($(find /etc/audit/rules.d -maxdepth 1 -type f -name *.rules -print))
        output_audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules"
fi

# Obtain the list of SUID/SGID binaries on the particular system (split by newline)
# into privileged_binaries array
IFS=$'\n' privileged_binaries=($(find / -xdev -type f -perm -4000 -o -type f -perm -2000 2>/dev/null))

# Keep list of SUID/SGID binaries that have been already handled within some previous iteration
declare -a sbinaries_to_skip=()

# For each found sbinary in privileged_binaries list
for sbinary in "${privileged_binaries[@]}"
do

        # Replace possible slash '/' character in sbinary definition so we could use it in sed expressions below
        sbinary_esc=${sbinary//$'/'/$'\/'}
        # Check if this sbinary wasn't already handled in some of the previous iterations
        # Return match only if whole sbinary definition matched (not in the case just prefix matched!!!)
        if [[ $(sed -ne "/${sbinary_esc}$/p" <<< ${sbinaries_to_skip[@]}) ]]
        then
                # If so, don't process it second time & go to process next sbinary
                continue
        fi

        # Reset the counter of inspected files when starting to check
        # presence of existing audit rule for new sbinary
        local count_of_inspected_files=0

        # For each audit rules file from the list of files to be inspected
        for afile in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
        do

                # Search current audit rules file's content for match. Match criteria:
                # * existing rule is for the same SUID/SGID binary we are currently processing (but
                #   can contain multiple -F path= elements covering multiple SUID/SGID binaries)
                # * existing rule contains all arguments from expected rule form (though can contain
                #   them in arbitrary order)

                base_search=$(sed -e "/-a always,exit/!d" -e "/-F path=${sbinary_esc}$/!d"   \
                                  -e "/-F path=[^[:space:]]\+/!d" -e "/-F perm=.*/!d"       \
                                  -e "/-F auid>=${min_auid}/!d" -e "/-F auid!=4294967295/!d"  \
                                  -e "/-k privileged/!d" $afile)

                # Increase the count of inspected files for this sbinary
                count_of_inspected_files=$((count_of_inspected_files + 1))

                # Define expected rule form for this binary
                expected_rule="-a always,exit -F path=${sbinary} -F perm=x -F auid>=${min_auid} -F auid!=4294967295 -k privileged"

                # Require execute access type to be set for existing audit rule
                exec_access='x'

                # Search current audit rules file's content for presence of rule pattern for this sbinary
                if [[ $base_search ]]
                then

                        # Current audit rules file already contains rule for this binary =>
                        # Store the exact form of found rule for this binary for further processing
                        concrete_rule=$base_search

                        # Select all other SUID/SGID binaries possibly also present in the found rule
                        IFS=$'\n' handled_sbinaries=($(grep -o -e "-F path=[^[:space:]]\+" <<< $concrete_rule))
                        IFS=$' ' handled_sbinaries=(${handled_sbinaries[@]//-F path=/})

                        # Merge the list of such SUID/SGID binaries found in this iteration with global list ignoring duplicates
                        sbinaries_to_skip=($(for i in "${sbinaries_to_skip[@]}" "${handled_sbinaries[@]}"; do echo $i; done | sort -du))

                        # Separate concrete_rule into three sections using hash '#'
                        # sign as a delimiter around rule's permission section borders
                        concrete_rule=$(echo $concrete_rule | sed -n "s/\(.*\)\+\(-F perm=[rwax]\+\)\+/\1#\2#/p")

                        # Split concrete_rule into head, perm, and tail sections using hash '#' delimiter
                        IFS=$'#' read rule_head rule_perm rule_tail <<<  "$concrete_rule"

                        # Extract already present exact access type [r|w|x|a] from rule's permission section
                        access_type=${rule_perm//-F perm=/}

                        # Verify current permission access type(s) for rule contain 'x' (execute) permission
                        if ! grep -q "$exec_access" <<< "$access_type"
                        then

                                # If not, append the 'x' (execute) permission to the existing access type bits
                                access_type="$access_type$exec_access"
                                # Reconstruct the permissions section for the rule
                                new_rule_perm="-F perm=$access_type"
                                # Update existing rule in current audit rules file with the new permission section
                                sed -i "s#${rule_head}\(.*\)${rule_tail}#${rule_head}${new_rule_perm}${rule_tail}#" $afile

                        fi

                # If the required audit rule for particular sbinary wasn't found yet, insert it under following conditions:
                #
                # * in the "auditctl" mode of operation insert particular rule each time
                #   (because in this mode there's only one file -- /etc/audit/audit.rules to be inspected for presence of this rule),
                #
                # * in the "augenrules" mode of operation insert particular rule only once and only in case we have already
                #   searched all of the files from /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules location (since that audit rule can be defined
                #   in any of those files and if not, we want it to be inserted only once into /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules file)
                #
                elif [ "$tool" == "auditctl" ] || [[ "$tool" == "augenrules" && $count_of_inspected_files -eq "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" ]]
                then

                        # Current audit rules file's content doesn't contain expected rule for this
                        # SUID/SGID binary yet => append it
                        echo $expected_rule >> $output_audit_file
                fi

        done

done

}

perform_audit_rules_privileged_commands_remediation "auditctl" "1000"
perform_audit_rules_privileged_commands_remediation "augenrules" "1000"

Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful)rule

At a minimum the audit system should collect media exportation events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system:

-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k export
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system:
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k export

Rationale:

The unauthorized exportation of data to external media could result in an information leak where classified information, Privacy Act information, and intellectual property could be lost. An audit trail should be created each time a filesystem is mounted to help identify and guard against information loss.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	GROUP="mount"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k export"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by Userrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect file deletion events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system:

-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k delete
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system:
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k delete

Rationale:

Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
	# Use escaped BRE regex to specify rule group
	GROUP="\(rmdir\|unlink\|rename\)"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k delete"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actionsrule

At a minimum the audit system should collect administrator actions for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d:

-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions

Rationale:

The actions taken by system administrators should be audited to keep a record of what was executed on the system, as well as, for accountability purposes.

Remediation script:


# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/sudoers" "wa" "actions"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/sudoers" "wa" "actions"

Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloadingrule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d to capture kernel module loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system:

-w /usr/sbin/insmod -p x -k modules
-w /usr/sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules
-w /usr/sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to capture kernel module loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system:
-w /usr/sbin/insmod -p x -k modules
-w /usr/sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules
-w /usr/sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules

Rationale:

The addition/removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel.

Remediation script:


# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
# Note: 32-bit kernel modules can't be loaded / unloaded on 64-bit kernel =>
#       it's not required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence
#       of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. Therefore for
#       each system it's enought to check presence of system's native rule form.
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -k *"
	# Use escaped BRE regex to specify rule group
	GROUP="\(init\|delete\)_module"
	FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules"
	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_syscall_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect

# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
        key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
        # Check if particular audit rule is already defined
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
        done
        # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
        # * follow the rule pattern, and
        # * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
        # * are current syscall group specific
        IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d"  "$audit_file"))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS

        # Process rules found case-by-case
        for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
        do
                # Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
                if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
                then
                        # If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
                        rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
                        # Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
                        # of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
                        if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
                        then
                                # Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
                                # subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
                                # Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
                        else
                                # Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
                                # for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
                                # group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
                                # since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
                                # Therefore:
                                # * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
                                # * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
                                # keep those not belonging to this syscall group
                                # (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
                                # * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
                                # if the same rule not already present
                                #
                                # 1) Delete the original rule
                                sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
                                # 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
                                # Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
                                IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                                # Reset IFS back to default
                                unset $IFS
                                # Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
                                new_syscalls_for_rule=''
                                # Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
                                for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
                                do
                                        # Skip empty $syscall_arg values
                                        if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
                                        then
                                                continue
                                        fi
                                        # If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
                                        # (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
                                        if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
                                        then
                                                new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
                                        fi
                                done
                                # Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
                                updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
                                # Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
                                updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
                                # 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
                                #    (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
                                if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
                                then
                                        echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
                                fi
                        fi
                else
                        # $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
                        # architecture & key => don't insert it second time
                        append_expected_rule=1
                fi
        done

        # We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
        # Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
        # Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
        if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
        then
                echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
        fi
done

}

	fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
	fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done

# Then perform the remediations for the watch rules
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/usr/sbin/insmod" "x" "modules"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/usr/sbin/insmod" "x" "modules"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/usr/sbin/rmmod" "x" "modules"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/usr/sbin/rmmod" "x" "modules"

function fix_audit_watch_rule {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
        echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
fi

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#       augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#       augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect

# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
        echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
        echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
        exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
        files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
        # Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
        # Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
        IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
        # Reset IFS back to default
        unset $IFS
        # For each of the matched entries
        for match in "${matches[@]}"
        do
                # Extract filepath from the match
                rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
                # Append that path into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
        done
        # Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
        if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
        then
                # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
                files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
                # If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
                if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
                then
                        touch "$files_to_inspect"
                        chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
                fi
        fi
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do

        # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
        if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
        then
                # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
                # all of the required access type bits

                # Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
                local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
                # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
                local sp="[[:space:]]"
                # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
                current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
                # Split required access bits string into characters array
                # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
                for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
                do
                        # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
                        # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
                        # If not, append that bit at the end
                        if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
                        then
                                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
                        fi
                done
                # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
                # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
                sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
        else
                # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
                # with proper key

                echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
        fi
done
}

fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/usr/sbin/modprobe" "x" "modules"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/usr/sbin/modprobe" "x" "modules"

Make the auditd Configuration Immutablerule

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to make the auditd configuration immutable:

-e 2
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to make the auditd configuration immutable:
-e 2
With this setting, a reboot will be required to change any audit rules.

Rationale:

Making the audit configuration immutable prevents accidental as well as malicious modification of the audit rules, although it may be problematic if legitimate changes are needed during system operation

identifiers: 

references:  AC-6, AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), IR-5, Req-10.5.2, 5.2.18

Remediation script:

# Traverse all of:
#
# /etc/audit/audit.rules,			(for auditctl case)
# /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules			(for augenrules case)
#
# files to check if '-e .*' setting is present in that '*.rules' file already.
# If found, delete such occurrence since auditctl(8) manual page instructs the
# '-e 2' rule should be placed as the last rule in the configuration
find /etc/audit /etc/audit/rules.d -maxdepth 1 -type f -name *.rules -exec sed -i '/-e[[:space:]]\+.*/d' {} ';'

# Append '-e 2' requirement at the end of both:
# * /etc/audit/audit.rules file 		(for auditctl case)
# * /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules		(for augenrules case)

for AUDIT_FILE in "/etc/audit/audit.rules" "/etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules"
do
	echo '' >> $AUDIT_FILE
	echo '# Set the audit.rules configuration immutable per security requirements' >> $AUDIT_FILE
	echo '# Reboot is required to change audit rules once this setting is applied' >> $AUDIT_FILE
	echo '-e 2' >> $AUDIT_FILE
done

Enable auditd Servicerule

The auditd service is an essential userspace component of the Linux Auditing System, as it is responsible for writing audit records to disk. The auditd service can be enabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl enable auditd.service

Rationale:

Without establishing what type of events occurred, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events leading up to an outage or attack.
Ensuring the auditd service is active ensures audit records generated by the kernel are appropriately recorded.

Remediation script:

function service_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local service_state=$1
local service=$2
local xinetd=$(echo $3 | cut -d'=' -f2)

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: service_command 'enable/disable' 'service_name.service'"
  echo
  echo "To enable or disable xinetd services add \'xinetd=service_name\'"
  echo "as the last argument"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If systemctl is installed, use systemctl command; otherwise, use the service/chkconfig commands
if [ -f "/usr/bin/systemctl" ] ; then
  service_util="/usr/bin/systemctl"
else
  service_util="/sbin/service"
  chkconfig_util="/sbin/chkconfig"
fi

# If disable is not specified in arg1, set variables to enable services.
# Otherwise, variables are to be set to disable services.
if [ "$service_state" != 'disable' ] ; then
  service_state="enable"
  service_operation="start"
  chkconfig_state="on"
else
  service_state="disable"
  service_operation="stop"
  chkconfig_state="off"
fi

# If chkconfig_util is not empty, use chkconfig/service commands.
if ! [ "x$chkconfig_util" = x ] ; then
  $service_util $service $service_operation
  $chkconfig_util --level 0123456 $service $chkconfig_state
else
  $service_util $service_operation $service
  $service_util $service_state $service
fi

# Test if local variable xinetd is empty using non-bashism.
# If empty, then xinetd is not being used.
if ! [ "x$xinetd" = x ] ; then
  grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd && \

  if ! [ "$service_operation" != 'disable' ] ; then
    sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = no/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
  else
    sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
  fi
fi

}

service_command enable auditd.service

Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the Audit Daemonrule

To ensure all processes can be audited, even those which start prior to the audit daemon, add the argument audit=1 to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in /etc/default/grub, in the manner below:

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="crashkernel=auto rd.lvm.lv=VolGroup/LogVol06 rd.lvm.lv=VolGroup/lv_swap rhgb quiet rd.shell=0 audit=1"

warning  The GRUB 2 configuration file, grub.cfg, is automatically updated each time a new kernel is installed. Note that any changes to /etc/default/grub require rebuilding the grub.cfg file. To update the GRUB 2 configuration file manually, use the
grub2-mkconfig -o
command as follows:
  • On BIOS-based machines, issue the following command as root:
    ~]# grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  • On UEFI-based machines, issue the following command as root:
    ~]# grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg
Rationale:

Each process on the system carries an "auditable" flag which indicates whether its activities can be audited. Although auditd takes care of enabling this for all processes which launch after it does, adding the kernel argument ensures it is set for every process during boot.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(1), AU-14(1), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-10, IR-5, 1464, 130, Req-10.3, 5.2.3

Remediation script:

# Correct the form of default kernel command line in /etc/default/grub
grep -q ^GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\".*audit=0.*\" /etc/default/grub && \
  sed -i "s/audit=[^[:space:]\+]/audit=1/g" /etc/default/grub
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
  sed -i "s/\(GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\)\"\(.*\)\"/\1\"\2 audit=1\"/" /etc/default/grub
fi

# Correct the form of kernel command line for each installed kernel
# in the bootloader
/sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit=1"

Servicesgroup

The best protection against vulnerable software is running less software. This section describes how to review the software which Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 installs on a system and disable software which is not needed. It then enumerates the software packages installed on a default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 system and provides guidance about which ones can be safely disabled.

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 provides a convenient minimal install option that essentially installs the bare necessities for a functional system. When building Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 servers, it is highly recommended to select the minimal packages and then build up the system from there.

contains 60 rules

Obsolete Servicesgroup

This section discusses a number of network-visible services which have historically caused problems for system security, and for which disabling or severely limiting the service has been the best available guidance for some time. As a result of this, many of these services are not installed as part of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 by default.

Organizations which are running these services should switch to more secure equivalents as soon as possible. If it remains absolutely necessary to run one of these services for legacy reasons, care should be taken to restrict the service as much as possible, for instance by configuring host firewall software such as firewalld to restrict access to the vulnerable service to only those remote hosts which have a known need to use it.

contains 14 rules

Xinetdgroup

The xinetd service acts as a dedicated listener for some network services (mostly, obsolete ones) and can be used to provide access controls and perform some logging. It has been largely obsoleted by other features, and it is not installed by default. The older Inetd service is not even available as part of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.

contains 2 rules

Disable xinetd Servicerule

The xinetd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable xinetd.service

Rationale:

The xinetd service provides a dedicated listener service for some programs, which is no longer necessary for commonly-used network services. Disabling it ensures that these uncommon services are not running, and also prevents attacks against xinetd itself.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 305, Test attestation on 20121026 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable xinetd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable xinetd.service

#
# Stop xinetd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop xinetd.service

Uninstall xinetd Packagerule

The xinetd package can be uninstalled with the following command:

$ sudo yum erase xinetd

Rationale:

Removing the xinetd package decreases the risk of the xinetd service's accidental (or intentional) activation.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 305, 2.1.11, Test attestation on 20121026 by DS

Remediation script:

function package_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
  install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
  install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi

if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
  # If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
  if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
else
  # If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
  if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
fi

}

package_command remove xinetd

Telnetgroup

The telnet protocol does not provide confidentiality or integrity for information transmitted on the network. This includes authentication information such as passwords. Organizations which use telnet should be actively working to migrate to a more secure protocol.

contains 2 rules

Disable telnet Servicerule

The telnet service configuration file /etc/xinetd.d/telnet is not created automatically. If it was created manually, check the /etc/xinetd.d/telnet file and ensure that disable = no is changed to read disable = yes as follows below:

# description: The telnet server serves telnet sessions; it uses \\
#       unencrypted username/password pairs for authentication.
service telnet
{
        flags           = REUSE
        socket_type     = stream

        wait            = no
        user            = root
        server          = /usr/sbin/in.telnetd
        log_on_failure  += USERID
        disable         = yes
}
If the /etc/xinetd.d/telnet file does not exist, make sure that the activation of the telnet service on system boot is disabled via the following command: The rexec socket can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable rexec.socket

Rationale:

The telnet protocol uses unencrypted network communication, which means that data from the login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network. The telnet protocol is also subject to man-in-the-middle attacks.

Remediation script:
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/telnet && \
  sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/telnet

#
# Disable telnet.socket for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable telnet.socket

#
# Stop telnet.socket if currently running
#
systemctl stop telnet.socket

Uninstall telnet-server Packagerule

The telnet-server package can be uninstalled with the following command:

$ sudo yum erase telnet-server

Rationale:

It is detrimental for operating systems to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. These unnecessary capabilities are often overlooked and therefore may remain unsecure. They increase the risk to the platform by providing additional attack vectors.
The telnet service provides an unencrypted remote access service which does not provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session. If a privileged user were to login using this service, the privileged user password could be compromised.
Removing the telnet-server package decreases the risk of the telnet service's accidental (or intentional) activation.

Remediation script:
if rpm -qa | grep -q telnet-server; then
	yum -y remove telnet-server
fi

Rlogin, Rsh, and Rexecgroup

The Berkeley r-commands are legacy services which allow cleartext remote access and have an insecure trust model.

contains 5 rules

Disable rexec Servicerule

The rexec service, which is available with the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately as a systemd socket, should be disabled. If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rexec. If using systemd, The rexec socket can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable rexec.socket

Rationale:

The rexec service uses unencrypted network communications, which means that data from the login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 68, 1436, Test attestation on 20121026 by DS

Remediation script:
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/rexec && \
  sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/rexec

#
# Disable rexec.socket for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable rexec.socket

#
# Stop rexec.socket if currently running
#
systemctl stop rexec.socket

Disable rsh Servicerule

The rsh service, which is available with the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately as a systemd socket, should be disabled. If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rsh. If using systemd, The rsh socket can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable rsh.socket

Rationale:

The rsh service uses unencrypted network communications, which means that data from the login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network.

Remediation script:
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/rsh && \
  sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/rsh

#
# Disable rsh.socket for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable rsh.socket

#
# Stop rsh.socket if currently running
#
systemctl stop rsh.socket

Uninstall rsh Packagerule

The rsh package contains the client commands for the rsh services

Rationale:

These legacy clients contain numerous security exposures and have been replaced with the more secure SSH package. Even if the server is removed, it is best to ensure the clients are also removed to prevent users from inadvertently attempting to use these commands and therefore exposing their credentials. Note that removing the rsh package removes the clients for rsh,rcp, and rlogin.

identifiers: 

references:  2.1.4, Test attestation on 20140530 by JL

Remediation script:

function package_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
  install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
  install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi

if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
  # If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
  if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
else
  # If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
  if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
fi

}

package_command remove rsh

Disable rlogin Servicerule

The rlogin service, which is available with the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately as a systemd socket, should be disabled. If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rlogin. If using systemd, The rlogin socket can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable rlogin.socket

Rationale:

The rlogin service uses unencrypted network communications, which means that data from the login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network.

Remediation script:
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/rlogin && \
  sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/rlogin

#
# Disable rlogin.socket for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable rlogin.socket

#
# Stop rlogin.socket if currently running
#
systemctl stop rlogin.socket

Remove Rsh Trust Filesrule

The files /etc/hosts.equiv and ~/.rhosts (in each user's home directory) list remote hosts and users that are trusted by the local system when using the rshd daemon. To remove these files, run the following command to delete them from any location:

$ sudo rm /etc/hosts.equiv
$ rm ~/.rhosts

Rationale:

Trust files are convenient, but when used in conjunction with the R-services, they can allow unauthenticated access to a system.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 1436, Test attestation on 20121026 by DS

Remediation script:
find -type f -name .rhosts -exec rm -f '{}' \;
rm /etc/hosts.equiv

NISgroup

The Network Information Service (NIS), also known as 'Yellow Pages' (YP), and its successor NIS+ have been made obsolete by Kerberos, LDAP, and other modern centralized authentication services. NIS should not be used because it suffers from security problems inherent in its design, such as inadequate protection of important authentication information.

contains 2 rules

Uninstall ypserv Packagerule

The ypserv package can be uninstalled with the following command:

$ sudo yum erase ypserv

Rationale:

The NIS service provides an unencrypted authentication service which does not provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session. Removing the ypserv package decreases the risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of NIS or NIS+ services.

Remediation script:

function package_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
  install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
  install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi

if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
  # If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
  if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
else
  # If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
  if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
fi

}

package_command remove ypserv

Disable ypbind Servicerule

The ypbind service, which allows the system to act as a client in a NIS or NIS+ domain, should be disabled. The ypbind service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable ypbind.service

Rationale:

Disabling the ypbind service ensures the system is not acting as a client in a NIS or NIS+ domain.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 305, Test attestation on 20121026 by DS

Remediation script:

function service_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local service_state=$1
local service=$2
local xinetd=$(echo $3 | cut -d'=' -f2)

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: service_command 'enable/disable' 'service_name.service'"
  echo
  echo "To enable or disable xinetd services add \'xinetd=service_name\'"
  echo "as the last argument"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If systemctl is installed, use systemctl command; otherwise, use the service/chkconfig commands
if [ -f "/usr/bin/systemctl" ] ; then
  service_util="/usr/bin/systemctl"
else
  service_util="/sbin/service"
  chkconfig_util="/sbin/chkconfig"
fi

# If disable is not specified in arg1, set variables to enable services.
# Otherwise, variables are to be set to disable services.
if [ "$service_state" != 'disable' ] ; then
  service_state="enable"
  service_operation="start"
  chkconfig_state="on"
else
  service_state="disable"
  service_operation="stop"
  chkconfig_state="off"
fi

# If chkconfig_util is not empty, use chkconfig/service commands.
if ! [ "x$chkconfig_util" = x ] ; then
  $service_util $service $service_operation
  $chkconfig_util --level 0123456 $service $chkconfig_state
else
  $service_util $service_operation $service
  $service_util $service_state $service
fi

# Test if local variable xinetd is empty using non-bashism.
# If empty, then xinetd is not being used.
if ! [ "x$xinetd" = x ] ; then
  grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd && \

  if ! [ "$service_operation" != 'disable' ] ; then
    sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = no/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
  else
    sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
  fi
fi

}

service_command disable ypbind.service

TFTP Servergroup

TFTP is a lightweight version of the FTP protocol which has traditionally been used to configure networking equipment. However, TFTP provides little security, and modern versions of networking operating systems frequently support configuration via SSH or other more secure protocols. A TFTP server should be run only if no more secure method of supporting existing equipment can be found.

contains 3 rules

Disable tftp Servicerule

The tftp service should be disabled. The tftp service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable tftp.service

Rationale:

Disabling the tftp service ensures the system is not acting as a TFTP server, which does not provide encryption or authentication.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 1436, Test attestation on 20121026 by DS

Remove tftp Daemonrule

Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) is a simple file transfer protocol, typically used to automatically transfer configuration or boot files between machines. TFTP does not support authentication and can be easily hacked. The package tftp is a client program that allows for connections to a tftp server.

Rationale:

It is recommended that TFTP be removed, unless there is a specific need for TFTP (such as a boot server). In that case, use extreme caution when configuring the services.

identifiers: 

references:  2.1.7

Ensure tftp Daemon Uses Secure Moderule

If running the tftp service is necessary, it should be configured to change its root directory at startup. To do so, ensure /etc/xinetd.d/tftp includes -s as a command line argument, as shown in the following example (which is also the default):

server_args = -s /var/lib/tftpboot

Rationale:

Using the -s option causes the TFTP service to only serve files from the given directory. Serving files from an intentionally-specified directory reduces the risk of sharing files which should remain private.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 366

Base Servicesgroup

This section addresses the base services that are installed on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 default installation which are not covered in other sections. Some of these services listen on the network and should be treated with particular discretion. Other services are local system utilities that may or may not be extraneous. In general, system services should be disabled if not required.

contains 23 rules

Disable Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd)rule

The Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) daemon collects and reports crash data when an application crash is detected. Using a variety of plugins, abrtd can email crash reports to system administrators, log crash reports to files, or forward crash reports to a centralized issue tracking system such as RHTSupport. The abrtd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable abrtd.service

Rationale:

Mishandling crash data could expose sensitive information about vulnerabilities in software executing on the local machine, as well as sensitive information from within a process's address space or registers.

Remediation script:
#
# Disable abrtd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable abrtd.service

#
# Stop abrtd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop abrtd.service

Disable Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (acpid)rule

The Advanced Configuration and Power Interface Daemon (acpid) dispatches ACPI events (such as power/reset button depressed) to userspace programs. The acpid service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable acpid.service

Rationale:

ACPI support is highly desirable for systems in some network roles, such as laptops or desktops. For other systems, such as servers, it may permit accidental or trivially achievable denial of service situations and disabling it is appropriate.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Remediation script:
#
# Disable acpid.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable acpid.service

#
# Stop acpid.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop acpid.service

Disable Certmonger Service (certmonger)rule

Certmonger is a D-Bus based service that attempts to simplify interaction with certifying authorities on networks which use public-key infrastructure. It is often combined with Red Hat's IPA (Identity Policy Audit) security information management solution to aid in the management of certificates. The certmonger service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable certmonger.service

Rationale:

The services provided by certmonger may be essential for systems fulfilling some roles a PKI infrastructure, but its functionality is not necessary for many other use cases.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Remediation script:
#
# Disable certmonger.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable certmonger.service

#
# Stop certmonger.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop certmonger.service

Disable Control Group Config (cgconfig)rule

Control groups allow an administrator to allocate system resources (such as CPU, memory, network bandwidth, etc) among a defined group (or groups) of processes executing on a system. The cgconfig daemon starts at boot and establishes the predefined control groups. The cgconfig service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable cgconfig.service

Rationale:

Unless control groups are used to manage system resources, running the cgconfig service is not necessary.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Remediation script:
#
# Disable cgconfig.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable cgconfig.service

#
# Stop cgconfig.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop cgconfig.service

Disable Control Group Rules Engine (cgred)rule

The cgred service moves tasks into control groups according to parameters set in the /etc/cgrules.conf configuration file. The cgred service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable cgred.service

Rationale:

Unless control groups are used to manage system resources, running the cgred service service is not necessary.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Remediation script:
#
# Disable cgred.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable cgred.service

#
# Stop cgred.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop cgred.service

Disable CPU Speed (cpupower)rule

The cpupower service can adjust the clock speed of supported CPUs based upon the current processing load thereby conserving power and reducing heat. The cpupower service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable cpupower.service

Rationale:

The cpupower service is only necessary if adjusting the CPU clock speed provides benefit. Traditionally this has included laptops (to enhance battery life), but may also apply to server or desktop environments where conserving power is highly desirable or necessary.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Enable IRQ Balance (irqbalance)rule

The irqbalance service optimizes the balance between power savings and performance through distribution of hardware interrupts across multiple processors. The irqbalance service can be enabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl enable irqbalance.service

Rationale:

In an environment with multiple processors (now common), the irqbalance service provides potential speedups for handling interrupt requests.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Remediation script:
#
# Enable irqbalance.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl enable irqbalance.service

#
# Start irqbalance.service if not currently running
#
systemctl start irqbalance.service

Disable KDump Kernel Crash Analyzer (kdump)rule

The kdump service provides a kernel crash dump analyzer. It uses the kexec system call to boot a secondary kernel ("capture" kernel) following a system crash, which can load information from the crashed kernel for analysis. The kdump service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable kdump.service

Rationale:

Kernel core dumps may contain the full contents of system memory at the time of the crash. Kernel core dumps consume a considerable amount of disk space and may result in denial of service by exhausting the available space on the target file system partition. Unless the system is used for kernel development or testing, there is little need to run the kdump service.

Remediation script:
#
# Disable kdump.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable kdump.service

#
# Stop kdump.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop kdump.service

Disable Software RAID Monitor (mdmonitor)rule

The mdmonitor service is used for monitoring a software RAID array; hardware RAID setups do not use this service. The mdmonitor service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable mdmonitor.service

Rationale:

If software RAID monitoring is not required, there is no need to run this service.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Remediation script:
#
# Disable mdmonitor.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable mdmonitor.service

#
# Stop mdmonitor.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop mdmonitor.service

Disable D-Bus IPC Service (messagebus)rule

D-Bus provides an IPC mechanism used by a growing list of programs, such as those used for Gnome, Bluetooth, and Avahi. Due to these dependencies, disabling D-Bus may not be practical for many systems. The messagebus service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable messagebus.service

Rationale:

If no services which require D-Bus are needed, then it can be disabled. As a broker for IPC between processes of different privilege levels, it could be a target for attack. However, disabling D-Bus is likely to be impractical for any system which needs to provide a graphical login session.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Remediation script:
#
# Disable messagebus.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable messagebus.service

#
# Stop messagebus.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop messagebus.service

Disable Network Console (netconsole)rule

The netconsole service is responsible for loading the netconsole kernel module, which logs kernel printk messages over UDP to a syslog server. This allows debugging of problems where disk logging fails and serial consoles are impractical. The netconsole service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable netconsole.service

Rationale:

The netconsole service is not necessary unless there is a need to debug kernel panics, which is not common.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 381

Remediation script:
#
# Disable netconsole for all run levels
#
chkconfig --level 0123456 netconsole off

#
# Stop netconsole if currently running
#
service netconsole stop

Disable ntpdate Service (ntpdate)rule

The ntpdate service sets the local hardware clock by polling NTP servers when the system boots. It synchronizes to the NTP servers listed in /etc/ntp/step-tickers or /etc/ntp.conf and then sets the local hardware clock to the newly synchronized system time. The ntpdate service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable ntpdate.service

Rationale:

The ntpdate service may only be suitable for systems which are rebooted frequently enough that clock drift does not cause problems between reboots. In any event, the functionality of the ntpdate service is now available in the ntpd program and should be considered deprecated.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 382, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Disable Odd Job Daemon (oddjobd)rule

The oddjobd service exists to provide an interface and access control mechanism through which specified privileged tasks can run tasks for unprivileged client applications. Communication with oddjobd through the system message bus. The oddjobd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable oddjobd.service

Rationale:

The oddjobd service may provide necessary functionality in some environments, and can be disabled if it is not needed. Execution of tasks by privileged programs, on behalf of unprivileged ones, has traditionally been a source of privilege escalation security issues.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 381, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable oddjobd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable oddjobd.service

#
# Stop oddjobd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop oddjobd.service

Disable Portreserve (portreserve)rule

The portreserve service is a TCP port reservation utility that can be used to prevent portmap from binding to well known TCP ports that are required for other services. The portreserve service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable portreserve.service

Rationale:

The portreserve service provides helpful functionality by preventing conflicting usage of ports in the reserved port range, but it can be disabled if not needed.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable portreserve.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable portreserve.service

#
# Stop portreserve.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop portreserve.service

Enable Process Accounting (psacct)rule

The process accounting service, psacct, works with programs including acct and ac to allow system administrators to view user activity, such as commands issued by users of the system. The psacct service can be enabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl enable psacct.service

Rationale:

The psacct service can provide administrators a convenient view into some user activities. However, it should be noted that the auditing system and its audit records provide more authoritative and comprehensive records.

identifiers: 

references:  AU-12, CM-7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Enable psacct.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl enable psacct.service

#
# Start psacct.service if not currently running
#
systemctl start psacct.service

Disable Apache Qpid (qpidd)rule

The qpidd service provides high speed, secure, guaranteed delivery services. It is an implementation of the Advanced Message Queuing Protocol. By default the qpidd service will bind to port 5672 and listen for connection attempts. The qpidd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable qpidd.service

Rationale:

The qpidd service is automatically installed when the "base" package selection is selected during installation. The qpidd service listens for network connections, which increases the attack surface of the system. If the system is not intended to receive AMQP traffic, then the qpidd service is not needed and should be disabled or removed.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 382

Remediation script:
#
# Disable qpidd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable qpidd.service

#
# Stop qpidd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop qpidd.service

Disable Quota Netlink (quota_nld)rule

The quota_nld service provides notifications to users of disk space quota violations. It listens to the kernel via a netlink socket for disk quota violations and notifies the appropriate user of the violation using D-Bus or by sending a message to the terminal that the user has last accessed. The quota_nld service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable quota_nld.service

Rationale:

If disk quotas are enforced on the local system, then the quota_nld service likely provides useful functionality and should remain enabled. However, if disk quotas are not used or user notification of disk quota violation is not desired then there is no need to run this service.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable quota_nld.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable quota_nld.service

#
# Stop quota_nld.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop quota_nld.service

Disable Network Router Discovery Daemon (rdisc)rule

The rdisc service implements the client side of the ICMP Internet Router Discovery Protocol (IRDP), which allows discovery of routers on the local subnet. If a router is discovered then the local routing table is updated with a corresponding default route. By default this daemon is disabled. The rdisc service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable rdisc.service

Rationale:

General-purpose systems typically have their network and routing information configured statically by a system administrator. Workstations or some special-purpose systems often use DHCP (instead of IRDP) to retrieve dynamic network configuration information.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), AC-4, CM-7, 382, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable rdisc.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable rdisc.service

#
# Stop rdisc.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop rdisc.service

Disable Red Hat Network Service (rhnsd)rule

The Red Hat Network service automatically queries Red Hat Network servers to determine whether there are any actions that should be executed, such as package updates. This only occurs if the system was registered to an RHN server or satellite and managed as such. The rhnsd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable rhnsd.service

Rationale:

Although systems management and patching is extremely important to system security, management by a system outside the enterprise enclave is not desirable for some environments. However, if the system is being managed by RHN or RHN Satellite Server the rhnsd daemon can remain on.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, 382, 1.2.4, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable rhnsd for all run levels
#
chkconfig --level 0123456 rhnsd off

#
# Stop rhnsd if currently running
#
service rhnsd stop

Disable Red Hat Subscription Manager Daemon (rhsmcertd)rule

The Red Hat Subscription Manager (rhsmcertd) periodically checks for changes in the entitlement certificates for a registered system and updates it accordingly. The rhsmcertd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable rhsmcertd.service

Rationale:

The rhsmcertd service can provide administrators with some additional control over which of their systems are entitled to particular subscriptions. However, for systems that are managed locally or which are not expected to require remote changes to their subscription status, it is unnecessary and can be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable rhsmcertd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable rhsmcertd.service

#
# Stop rhsmcertd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop rhsmcertd.service

Disable Cyrus SASL Authentication Daemon (saslauthd)rule

The saslauthd service handles plaintext authentication requests on behalf of the SASL library. The service isolates all code requiring superuser privileges for SASL authentication into a single process, and can also be used to provide proxy authentication services to clients that do not understand SASL based authentication. The saslauthd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable saslauthd.service

Rationale:

The saslauthd service provides essential functionality for performing authentication in some directory environments, such as those which use Kerberos and LDAP. For others, however, in which only local files may be consulted, it is not necessary and should be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  AC-17(8), CM-7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable saslauthd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable saslauthd.service

#
# Stop saslauthd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop saslauthd.service

Disable SMART Disk Monitoring Service (smartd)rule

SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Technology) is a feature of hard drives that allows them to detect symptoms of disk failure and relay an appropriate warning. The smartd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable smartd.service

Rationale:

SMART can help protect against denial of service due to failing hardware. Nevertheless, if it is not needed or the system's drives are not SMART-capable (such as solid state drives), it can be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable smartd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable smartd.service

#
# Stop smartd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop smartd.service

Disable System Statistics Reset Service (sysstat)rule

The sysstat service resets various I/O and CPU performance statistics to zero in order to begin counting from a fresh state at boot time. The sysstat service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable sysstat.service

Rationale:

By default the sysstat service merely runs a program at boot to reset the statistics, which can be retrieved using programs such as sar and sadc. These may provide useful insight into system operation, but unless used this service can be disabled.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable sysstat.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable sysstat.service

#
# Stop sysstat.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop sysstat.service

Cron and At Daemonsgroup

The cron and at services are used to allow commands to be executed at a later time. The cron service is required by almost all systems to perform necessary maintenance tasks, while at may or may not be required on a given system. Both daemons should be configured defensively.

contains 2 rules

Enable cron Servicerule

The crond service is used to execute commands at preconfigured times. It is required by almost all systems to perform necessary maintenance tasks, such as notifying root of system activity. The crond service can be enabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl enable crond.service

Rationale:

Due to its usage for maintenance and security-supporting tasks, enabling the cron daemon is essential.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 6.1.2, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Enable crond.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl enable crond.service

#
# Start crond.service if not currently running
#
systemctl start crond.service

Disable At Service (atd)rule

The at and batch commands can be used to schedule tasks that are meant to be executed only once. This allows delayed execution in a manner similar to cron, except that it is not recurring. The daemon atd keeps track of tasks scheduled via at and batch, and executes them at the specified time. The atd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable atd.service

Rationale:

The atd service could be used by an unsophisticated insider to carry out activities outside of a normal login session, which could complicate accountability. Furthermore, the need to schedule tasks with at or batch is not common.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 381

Remediation script:
#
# Disable atd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable atd.service

#
# Stop atd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop atd.service

SSH Servergroup

The SSH protocol is recommended for remote login and remote file transfer. SSH provides confidentiality and integrity for data exchanged between two systems, as well as server authentication, through the use of public key cryptography. The implementation included with the system is called OpenSSH, and more detailed documentation is available from its website, http://www.openssh.org. Its server program is called sshd and provided by the RPM package openssh-server.

contains 3 rules

Configure OpenSSH Server if Necessarygroup

If the system needs to act as an SSH server, then certain changes should be made to the OpenSSH daemon configuration file /etc/ssh/sshd_config. The following recommendations can be applied to this file. See the sshd_config(5) man page for more detailed information.

contains 3 rules

Allow Only SSH Protocol 2rule

Only SSH protocol version 2 connections should be permitted. The default setting in /etc/ssh/sshd_config is correct, and can be verified by ensuring that the following line appears:

Protocol 2

Rationale:

SSH protocol version 1 is an insecure implementation of the SSH protocol and has many well-known vulnerability exploits. Exploits of the SSH daemon could provide immediate root access to the system.

Remediation script:
grep -qi ^Protocol /etc/ssh/sshd_config && \
  sed -i "s/Protocol.*/Protocol 2/gI" /etc/ssh/sshd_config
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
    echo "Protocol 2" >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
fi

Use Only Approved Ciphersrule

Limit the ciphers to those algorithms which are FIPS-approved. Counter (CTR) mode is also preferred over cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode. The following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config demonstrates use of FIPS-approved ciphers:

Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
The man page sshd_config(5) contains a list of supported ciphers.

Rationale:

Unapproved mechanisms that are used for authentication to the cryptographic module are not verified and therefore cannot be relied upon to provide confidentiality or integrity, and system data may be compromised.
Operating systems utilizing encryption are required to use FIPS-compliant mechanisms for authenticating to cryptographic modules.
FIPS 140-2 is the current standard for validating that mechanisms used to access cryptographic modules utilize authentication that meets industry and government requirements. For government systems, this allows Security Levels 1, 2, 3, or 4 for use on Red Hat Enterprise Linux.

Remediation script:

function replace_or_append {
  local config_file=$1
  local key=$2
  local value=$3
  local cce=$4
  local format=$5

  # Check sanity of the input
  if [ $# -lt "3" ]
  then
        echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
        echo
        echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
        echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
        echo "Aborting."
        exit 1
  fi

  # Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
  # Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
  if test -L $config_file; then
    sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
  else
    sed_command="sed -i"
  fi

  # Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
  # If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
  if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
    cce="CCE-${cce}"
  else
    cce="CCE"
  fi

  # Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
  # adding any search characters to the config file.
  stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)

  # If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
  if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
    printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
  else
    formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
  fi

  # If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
  if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
    $sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
  else
    echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
    echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
  fi

}

replace_or_append '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' '^Ciphers' 'aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc' 'CCENUM' '%s %s'

Avahi Servergroup

The Avahi daemon implements the DNS Service Discovery and Multicast DNS protocols, which provide service and host discovery on a network. It allows a system to automatically identify resources on the network, such as printers or web servers. This capability is also known as mDNSresponder and is a major part of Zeroconf networking.

contains 1 rule

Disable Avahi Server if Possiblegroup

Because the Avahi daemon service keeps an open network port, it is subject to network attacks. Disabling it can reduce the system's vulnerability to such attacks.

contains 1 rule

Disable Avahi Server Softwarerule

The avahi-daemon service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable avahi-daemon.service

Rationale:

Because the Avahi daemon service keeps an open network port, it is subject to network attacks. Its functionality is convenient but is only appropriate if the local network can be trusted.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 366, 3.3

Remediation script:
#
# Disable avahi-daemon.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable avahi-daemon.service

#
# Stop avahi-daemon.service if currently running
# and disable avahi-daemon.socket so the avahi-daemon.service
# can't be activated
#
systemctl stop avahi-daemon.service
systemctl disable avahi-daemon.socket

Print Supportgroup

The Common Unix Printing System (CUPS) service provides both local and network printing support. A system running the CUPS service can accept print jobs from other systems, process them, and send them to the appropriate printer. It also provides an interface for remote administration through a web browser. The CUPS service is installed and activated by default. The project homepage and more detailed documentation are available at http://www.cups.org.

contains 3 rules

Configure the CUPS Service if Necessarygroup

CUPS provides the ability to easily share local printers with other machines over the network. It does this by allowing machines to share lists of available printers. Additionally, each machine that runs the CUPS service can potentially act as a print server. Whenever possible, the printer sharing and print server capabilities of CUPS should be limited or disabled. The following recommendations should demonstrate how to do just that.

contains 2 rules

Disable Printer Browsing Entirely if Possiblerule

By default, CUPS listens on the network for printer list broadcasts on UDP port 631. This functionality is called printer browsing. To disable printer browsing entirely, edit the CUPS configuration file, located at /etc/cups/cupsd.conf, to include the following:

Browsing Off

Rationale:

The CUPS print service can be configured to broadcast a list of available printers to the network. Other machines on the network, also running the CUPS print service, can be configured to listen to these broadcasts and add and configure these printers for immediate use. By disabling this browsing capability, the machine will no longer generate or receive such broadcasts.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Disable Print Server Capabilitiesrule

To prevent remote users from potentially connecting to and using locally configured printers, disable the CUPS print server sharing capabilities. To do so, limit how the server will listen for print jobs by removing the more generic port directive from /etc/cups/cupsd.conf:

Port 631
and replacing it with the Listen directive:
Listen localhost:631
This will prevent remote users from printing to locally configured printers while still allowing local users on the machine to print normally.

Rationale:

By default, locally configured printers will not be shared over the network, but if this functionality has somehow been enabled, these recommendations will disable it again. Be sure to disable outgoing printer list broadcasts, or remote users will still be able to see the locally configured printers, even if they cannot actually print to them. To limit print serving to a particular set of users, use the Policy directive.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Disable the CUPS Servicerule

The cups service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable cups.service

Rationale:

Turn off unneeded services to reduce attack surface.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 3.4

Remediation script:
#
# Disable cups.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable cups.service

#
# Stop cups.service if currently running
# and disable cups.path and cups.socket so
# cups.service can't be activated
#
systemctl stop cups.service
systemctl disable cups.path
systemctl disable cups.socket

DHCPgroup

The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) allows systems to request and obtain an IP address and other configuration parameters from a server.

This guide recommends configuring networking on clients by manually editing the appropriate files under /etc/sysconfig. Use of DHCP can make client systems vulnerable to compromise by rogue DHCP servers, and should be avoided unless necessary. If using DHCP is necessary, however, there are best practices that should be followed to minimize security risk.

contains 3 rules

Disable DHCP Servergroup

The DHCP server dhcpd is not installed or activated by default. If the software was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a DHCP server, it should be disabled and removed.

contains 2 rules

Disable DHCP Servicerule

The dhcpd service should be disabled on any system that does not need to act as a DHCP server. The dhcpd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable dhcpd.service

Rationale:

Unmanaged or unintentionally activated DHCP servers may provide faulty information to clients, interfering with the operation of a legitimate site DHCP server if there is one.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 366, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:
#
# Disable dhcpd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable dhcpd.service

#
# Stop dhcpd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop dhcpd.service

Uninstall DHCP Server Packagerule

If the system does not need to act as a DHCP server, the dhcp package can be uninstalled. The dhcp package can be removed with the following command:

$ sudo yum erase dhcp

Rationale:

Removing the DHCP server ensures that it cannot be easily or accidentally reactivated and disrupt network operation.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 366, 3.5, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:

function package_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
  install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
  install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi

if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
  # If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
  if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
else
  # If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
  if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
fi

}

package_command remove dhcp

Disable DHCP Clientgroup

DHCP is the default network configuration method provided by the system installer, and common on many networks. Nevertheless, manual management of IP addresses for systems implies a greater degree of management and accountability for network activity.

contains 1 rule

Disable DHCP Clientrule

For each interface on the system (e.g. eth0), edit /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface and make the following changes:

  • Correct the BOOTPROTO line to read:
    BOOTPROTO=none
  • Add or correct the following lines, substituting the appropriate values based on your site's addressing scheme:
    NETMASK=255.255.255.0
    IPADDR=192.168.1.2
    GATEWAY=192.168.1.1

Rationale:

DHCP relies on trusting the local network. If the local network is not trusted, then it should not be used. However, the automatic configuration provided by DHCP is commonly used and the alternative, manual configuration, presents an unacceptable burden in many circumstances.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 366, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Network Time Protocolgroup

The Network Time Protocol is used to manage the system clock over a network. Computer clocks are not very accurate, so time will drift unpredictably on unmanaged systems. Central time protocols can be used both to ensure that time is consistent among a network of machines, and that their time is consistent with the outside world.

If every system on a network reliably reports the same time, then it is much easier to correlate log messages in case of an attack. In addition, a number of cryptographic protocols (such as Kerberos) use timestamps to prevent certain types of attacks. If your network does not have synchronized time, these protocols may be unreliable or even unusable.

Depending on the specifics of the network, global time accuracy may be just as important as local synchronization, or not very important at all. If your network is connected to the Internet, using a public timeserver (or one provided by your enterprise) provides globally accurate timestamps which may be essential in investigating or responding to an attack which originated outside of your network.

A typical network setup involves a small number of internal systems operating as NTP servers, and the remainder obtaining time information from those internal servers.

There is a choice between the daemons ntpd and chronyd, which are available from the repositories in the ntp and chrony packages respectively.

The default chronyd daemon can work well when external time references are only intermittently accesible, can perform well even when the network is congested for longer periods of time, can usually synchronize the clock faster and with better time accuracy, and quickly adapts to sudden changes in the rate of the clock, for example, due to changes in the temperature of the crystal oscillator. Chronyd should be considered for all systems which are frequently suspended or otherwise intermittently disconnected and reconnected to a network. Mobile and virtual systems for example.

The ntpd NTP daemon fully supports NTP protocol version 4 (RFC 5905), including broadcast, multicast, manycast clients and servers, and the orphan mode. It also supports extra authentication schemes based on public-key cryptography (RFC 5906). The NTP daemon (ntpd) should be considered for systems which are normally kept permanently on. Systems which are required to use broadcast or multicast IP, or to perform authentication of packets with the Autokey protocol, should consider using ntpd.

Refer to https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/ch-Configuring_NTP_Using_the_chrony_Suite.html for more detailed comparison of features of chronyd and ntpd daemon features respectively, and for further guidance how to choose between the two NTP daemons.

The upstream manual pages at http://chrony.tuxfamily.org/manual.html for chronyd and http://www.ntp.org for ntpd provide additional information on the capabilities and configuration of each of the NTP daemons.

contains 3 rules

Enable the NTP Daemonrule

The chronyd service can be enabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl enable chronyd.service
Note: The chronyd daemon is enabled by default.

The ntpd service can be enabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl enable ntpd.service
Note: The ntpd daemon is not enabled by default. Though as mentioned in the previous sections in certain environments the ntpd daemon might be preferred to be used rather than the chronyd one. Refer to: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/ch-Configuring_NTP_Using_the_chrony_Suite.html for guidance which NTP daemon to choose depending on the environment used.

Rationale:

Enabling some of chronyd or ntpd services ensures that the NTP daemon will be running and that the system will synchronize its time to any servers specified. This is important whether the system is configured to be a client (and synchronize only its own clock) or it is also acting as an NTP server to other systems. Synchronizing time is essential for authentication services such as Kerberos, but it is also important for maintaining accurate logs and auditing possible security breaches.

The chronyd and ntpd NTP daemons offer all of the functionality of ntpdate, which is now deprecated. Additional information on this is available at http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Dev/DeprecatingNtpdate

identifiers: 

references:  AU-8(1), 160, Req-10.4, 3.6, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

Remediation script:


if ! `rpm -q --quiet chrony` && ! `rpm -q --quiet ntp-`; then

function package_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
  install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
  install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi

if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
  # If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
  if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
else
  # If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
  if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
fi

}

  package_command install chrony
  service_command enable chronyd
elif `rpm -q --quiet chrony`; then
  if ! [ `/usr/sbin/pidof ntpd` ] ; then

function service_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local service_state=$1
local service=$2
local xinetd=$(echo $3 | cut -d'=' -f2)

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: service_command 'enable/disable' 'service_name.service'"
  echo
  echo "To enable or disable xinetd services add \'xinetd=service_name\'"
  echo "as the last argument"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If systemctl is installed, use systemctl command; otherwise, use the service/chkconfig commands
if [ -f "/usr/bin/systemctl" ] ; then
  service_util="/usr/bin/systemctl"
else
  service_util="/sbin/service"
  chkconfig_util="/sbin/chkconfig"
fi

# If disable is not specified in arg1, set variables to enable services.
# Otherwise, variables are to be set to disable services.
if [ "$service_state" != 'disable' ] ; then
  service_state="enable"
  service_operation="start"
  chkconfig_state="on"
else
  service_state="disable"
  service_operation="stop"
  chkconfig_state="off"
fi

# If chkconfig_util is not empty, use chkconfig/service commands.
if ! [ "x$chkconfig_util" = x ] ; then
  $service_util $service $service_operation
  $chkconfig_util --level 0123456 $service $chkconfig_state
else
  $service_util $service_operation $service
  $service_util $service_state $service
fi

# Test if local variable xinetd is empty using non-bashism.
# If empty, then xinetd is not being used.
if ! [ "x$xinetd" = x ] ; then
  grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd && \

  if ! [ "$service_operation" != 'disable' ] ; then
    sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = no/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
  else
    sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
  fi
fi

}

    service_command enable chronyd
  fi
else

function service_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local service_state=$1
local service=$2
local xinetd=$(echo $3 | cut -d'=' -f2)

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: service_command 'enable/disable' 'service_name.service'"
  echo
  echo "To enable or disable xinetd services add \'xinetd=service_name\'"
  echo "as the last argument"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If systemctl is installed, use systemctl command; otherwise, use the service/chkconfig commands
if [ -f "/usr/bin/systemctl" ] ; then
  service_util="/usr/bin/systemctl"
else
  service_util="/sbin/service"
  chkconfig_util="/sbin/chkconfig"
fi

# If disable is not specified in arg1, set variables to enable services.
# Otherwise, variables are to be set to disable services.
if [ "$service_state" != 'disable' ] ; then
  service_state="enable"
  service_operation="start"
  chkconfig_state="on"
else
  service_state="disable"
  service_operation="stop"
  chkconfig_state="off"
fi

# If chkconfig_util is not empty, use chkconfig/service commands.
if ! [ "x$chkconfig_util" = x ] ; then
  $service_util $service $service_operation
  $chkconfig_util --level 0123456 $service $chkconfig_state
else
  $service_util $service_operation $service
  $service_util $service_state $service
fi

# Test if local variable xinetd is empty using non-bashism.
# If empty, then xinetd is not being used.
if ! [ "x$xinetd" = x ] ; then
  grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd && \

  if ! [ "$service_operation" != 'disable' ] ; then
    sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = no/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
  else
    sed -i "s/disable.*/disable         = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
  fi
fi

}

  service_command enable ntpd
fi

Specify a Remote NTP Serverrule

Depending on specific functional requirements of a concrete production environment, the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Server system can be configured to utilize the services of the chronyd NTP daemon (the default), or services of the ntpd NTP daemon. Refer to https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/ch-Configuring_NTP_Using_the_chrony_Suite.html for more detailed comparison of the features of both of the choices, and for further guidance how to choose between the two NTP daemons.
To specify a remote NTP server for time synchronization, perform the following:

  • if the system is configured to use the chronyd as the NTP daemon (the default), edit the file /etc/chrony.conf as follows,
  • if the system is configured to use the ntpd as the NTP daemon, edit the file /etc/ntp.conf as documented below.
Add or correct the following lines, substituting the IP or hostname of a remote NTP server for ntpserver:
server ntpserver
This instructs the NTP software to contact that remote server to obtain time data.

Rationale:

Synchronizing with an NTP server makes it possible to collate system logs from multiple sources or correlate computer events with real time events.

Remediation script:

var_multiple_time_servers="(N/A)"

if ! `/usr/sbin/pidof ntpd`; then
  if ! `grep -q ^server /etc/chrony.conf` ; then
    if ! `grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' /etc/chrony.conf` ; then
      for i in `echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n'` ; do
        echo -ne "\nserver $i iburst" >> /etc/chrony.conf
      done
    else
      sed -i 's/#[ ]*server/server/g' /etc/chrony.conf
    fi
  fi
else
  if ! `grep -q ^server /etc/ntp.conf` ; then
    if ! `grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' /etc/ntp.conf` ; then
      for i in `echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n'` ; do
        echo -ne "\nserver $i iburst" >> /etc/ntp.conf
      done
    else
      sed -i 's/#[ ]*server/server/g' /etc/ntp.conf
    fi
  fi
fi

Specify Additional Remote NTP Serversrule

Depending on specific functional requirements of a concrete production environment, the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Server system can be configured to utilize the services of the chronyd NTP daemon (the default), or services of the ntpd NTP daemon. Refer to https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/ch-Configuring_NTP_Using_the_chrony_Suite.html for more detailed comparison of the features of both of the choices, and for further guidance how to choose between the two NTP daemons.
Additional NTP servers can be specified for time synchronization. To do so, perform the following:

  • if the system is configured to use the chronyd as the NTP daemon (the default), edit the file /etc/chrony.conf as follows,
  • if the system is configured to use the ntpd as the NTP daemon, edit the file /etc/ntp.conf as documented below.
Add additional lines of the following form, substituting the IP address or hostname of a remote NTP server for ntpserver:
server ntpserver

Rationale:

Specifying additional NTP servers increases the availability of accurate time data, in the event that one of the specified servers becomes unavailable. This is typical for a system acting as an NTP server for other systems.

identifiers: 

references:  AU-8(1), Req-10.4.3

Remediation script:

var_multiple_time_servers="(N/A)"

if ! `/usr/sbin/pidof ntpd`; then
  if [ `grep -c '^server' /etc/chrony.conf` -lt 2 ]; then 
    if ! `grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' /etc/chrony.conf` ; then
      for i in `echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n'` ; do
        echo -ne "\nserver $i iburst" >> /etc/chrony.conf
      done
    else
      sed -i 's/#[ ]*server/server/g' /etc/chrony.conf
    fi
  fi
else
  if [ `grep -c '^server' /etc/ntp.conf` -lt 2 ]; then
    if ! `grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' /etc/ntp.conf` ; then
      for i in `echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n'` ; do
        echo -ne "\nserver $i iburst" >> /etc/ntp.conf
      done
    else
      sed -i 's/#[ ]*server/server/g' /etc/ntp.conf
    fi
  fi
fi

Mail Server Softwaregroup

Mail servers are used to send and receive email over the network. Mail is a very common service, and Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) are obvious targets of network attack. Ensure that machines are not running MTAs unnecessarily, and configure needed MTAs as defensively as possible.

Very few systems at any site should be configured to directly receive email over the network. Users should instead use mail client programs to retrieve email from a central server that supports protocols such as IMAP or POP3. However, it is normal for most systems to be independently capable of sending email, for instance so that cron jobs can report output to an administrator. Most MTAs, including Postfix, support a submission-only mode in which mail can be sent from the local system to a central site MTA (or directly delivered to a local account), but the system still cannot receive mail directly over a network.

The alternatives program in Red Hat Enterprise Linux permits selection of other mail server software (such as Sendmail), but Postfix is the default and is preferred. Postfix was coded with security in mind and can also be more effectively contained by SELinux as its modular design has resulted in separate processes performing specific actions. More information is available on its website, http://www.postfix.org.

contains 1 rule

Uninstall Sendmail Packagerule

Sendmail is not the default mail transfer agent and is not installed by default. The sendmail package can be removed with the following command:

$ sudo yum erase sendmail

Rationale:

The sendmail software was not developed with security in mind and its design prevents it from being effectively contained by SELinux. Postfix should be used instead.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

LDAPgroup

LDAP is a popular directory service, that is, a standardized way of looking up information from a central database. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 includes software that enables a system to act as both an LDAP client and server.

contains 1 rule

Configure OpenLDAP Servergroup

This section details some security-relevant settings for an OpenLDAP server. Installation and configuration of OpenLDAP on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 is available at: https://docs.redhat.com/docs/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/ch-Directory_Servers.html.

contains 1 rule

Uninstall openldap-servers Packagerule

The openldap-servers package should be removed if not in use. Is this machine the OpenLDAP server? If not, remove the package.

$ sudo yum erase openldap-servers
The openldap-servers RPM is not installed by default on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 machines. It is needed only by the OpenLDAP server, not by the clients which use LDAP for authentication. If the system is not intended for use as an LDAP Server it should be removed.

Rationale:

Unnecessary packages should not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. While this software is clearly essential on an LDAP server, it is not necessary on typical desktop or workstation systems.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 366, 3.7, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS

DNS Servergroup

Most organizations have an operational need to run at least one nameserver. However, there are many common attacks involving DNS server software, and this server software should be disabled on any system on which it is not needed.

contains 2 rules

Disable DNS Servergroup

DNS software should be disabled on any machine which does not need to be a nameserver. Note that the BIND DNS server software is not installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 by default. The remainder of this section discusses secure configuration of machines which must be nameservers.

contains 2 rules

Disable DNS Serverrule

The named service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable named.service

Rationale:

All network services involve some risk of compromise due to implementation flaws and should be disabled if possible.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 366

Remediation script:
#
# Disable named.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable named.service

#
# Stop named.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop named.service

Uninstall bind Packagerule

To remove the bind package, which contains the named service, run the following command:

$ sudo yum erase bind

Rationale:

If there is no need to make DNS server software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 366, 3.9

Remediation script:

function package_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
  install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
  install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi

if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
  # If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
  if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
else
  # If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
  if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
fi

}

package_command remove bind

FTP Servergroup

FTP is a common method for allowing remote access to files. Like telnet, the FTP protocol is unencrypted, which means that passwords and other data transmitted during the session can be captured and that the session is vulnerable to hijacking. Therefore, running the FTP server software is not recommended.

However, there are some FTP server configurations which may be appropriate for some environments, particularly those which allow only read-only anonymous access as a means of downloading data available to the public.

contains 2 rules

Disable vsftpd if Possiblegroup

To minimize attack surface, disable vsftpd if at all possible.

contains 2 rules

Disable vsftpd Servicerule

The vsftpd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable vsftpd.service

Rationale:

Running FTP server software provides a network-based avenue of attack, and should be disabled if not needed. Furthermore, the FTP protocol is unencrypted and creates a risk of compromising sensitive information.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 1436

Remediation script:
#
# Disable vsftpd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable vsftpd.service

#
# Stop vsftpd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop vsftpd.service

Uninstall vsftpd Packagerule

The vsftpd package can be removed with the following command:

$ sudo yum erase vsftpd

Rationale:

Removing the vsftpd package decreases the risk of its accidental activation.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-6(b), CM-7, 366, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, RHEL-07-040490, 3.10

Remediation script:

function package_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
  install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
  install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi

if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
  # If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
  if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
else
  # If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
  if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
fi

}

package_command remove vsftpd

Web Servergroup

The web server is responsible for providing access to content via the HTTP protocol. Web servers represent a significant security risk because:

  • The HTTP port is commonly probed by malicious sources
  • Web server software is very complex, and includes a long history of vulnerabilities
  • The HTTP protocol is unencrypted and vulnerable to passive monitoring


The system's default web server software is Apache 2 and is provided in the RPM package httpd.

contains 2 rules

Disable Apache if Possiblegroup

If Apache was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a web server, then it should be disabled and removed from the system.

contains 2 rules

Disable httpd Servicerule

The httpd service can be disabled with the following command:

$ sudo systemctl disable httpd.service

Rationale:

Running web server software provides a network-based avenue of attack, and should be disabled if not needed.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7

Remediation script:
#
# Disable httpd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable httpd.service

#
# Stop httpd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop httpd.service

Uninstall httpd Packagerule

The httpd package can be removed with the following command:

$ sudo yum erase httpd

Rationale:

If there is no need to make the web server software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation.

identifiers: 

references:  CM-7, 3.11

Remediation script:

function package_command {

# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2

# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
  echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
  echo "Aborting."
  exit 1
fi

# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
  install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
  install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi

if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
  # If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
  if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
else
  # If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
  if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
    $install_util -y $package_operation $package
  fi
fi

}

package_command remove httpd
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